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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Jason Christopher Isbell 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Psychology 
June 2017 
Title: Status Relevant Social Context, Group Membership, and Finger Length Ratio 
(2D:4D) as Predictors of Online Socioeconomic Behavior 
It is often argued that increased prenatal androgen exposure (as measured by the 
second-to-fourth-digit ratio, or 2D:4D) predicts increased aggression. Such simplified 
models may obscure subtler processes, however. Investigating moderating variables 
could elucidate more consistent results between these variables. Two moderators 
investigated here were status-relevant social norms and group membership. Aggression, 
as measured by the decision to reject an unfair offer in the ultimatum game (UG), was 
viewed as a context-dependent strategy of status acquisition dictated by social norms and 
driven by group membership. 
Recent research suggests 2D:4D may be more associated with status acquisition 
motives than with aggression per se. It was hypothesized that lower 2D:4D would predict 
increased aggression when aggressive behavior was endorsed by group members for 
gaining/maintaining status. Conversely, lower 2D:4D would predict decreased aggression 
when aggressive behavior was proscribed by group members for gaining/maintaining 
status. Based on the Male Warrior Hypothesis, although it was hypothesized that out-
group membership would predict aggressive behavior, it was also hypothesized that this 
 v 
effect would be maximal among those with lower 2D:4D, particularly when an 
aggression-for-status norm was endorsed.  
The data did not support the primary hypotheses. The digit ratio did not predict 
any DV. The norm manipulation did not affect UG decisions and there was a 
methodological issue with the group manipulation. The norm manipulation did affect 
secondary DVs, however. There were significant differences between the pro-, neutral, 
and anti-aggression groups regarding participants’ endorsement of a fictional character’s 
aggressive behavior to gain status. Those in the pro-aggression group endorsed it the 
most and those in the anti-aggression group endorsed it the least. Despite no effect of the 
norm manipulation on the decision in the UG, there was an effect of the manipulation on 
participants’ confessed intent, with those in the pro-aggression condition rating their 
decision to reject as “aggressive” more so than those in the anti-aggression condition. The 
norm manipulation also influenced meta-perceptions of how participants thought their 
teammates viewed them based on their decision in the UG. Exploratory analyses modeled 
these effects. Reasons for the manipulations failing to produce an effect on the primary 
DV are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
STATUS AND BEHAVIOR 
Social hierarchy, defined as “an implicit or explicit rank order of individuals or 
groups with respect to a valued social dimension,” is a persistent and salient feature of 
most human and nonhuman primate societies (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). One’s position 
in that hierarchy (or one’s status) is associated with the respect one receives and, to the 
extent that status is related to power, the control over resources one may have. Because of 
the potential reproductive benefits conferred by higher status, it is hypothesized that 
humans have evolved specific psychological mechanisms for signaling and competing for 
status (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). Indeed, people show preference and improved 
processing for socially hierarchical information (Zitek & Tiedens, 2012). They are also 
adept at perceiving their own status accurately, and are quick to locate and punish 
individuals who overestimate their respective status (Anderson, Ames, & Gosling, 2008). 
Individuals will put forth effort to gain status and even more effort to keep from losing it 
(Pettit, Yong, & Spataro, 2010). In short, processing, signaling, and maintaining status, 
and in some cases seeking to acquire it, are intrinsic components of the human experience 
(Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). 
Another important feature of status is its dynamic unfolding. Stratification to 
some degree is a constant across human organizations, and a given hierarchy may remain 
stable in its defined roles over a long period of time. However, which individual is 
assigned to a particular role at any given time can be a highly fluid process. One’s status 
is often allocated based on their perceived suitability for, and performance in, reaching 
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the group’s overall goals; therefore, if perceptions of one’s competence changes, or the 
goals of the group change, then often so does one’s status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). It 
is at the cross roads of where these varied status-related psychological mechanisms 
collide with dynamic group norms that the utility of aggression can enter the discussion. 
Aggression is often defined as overt behavior that has the intention of inflicting harm on 
another individual who wishes to avoid that harm (Baron & Richardson, 1994). This 
definition is deceptively simple, as aggression may vary as a function of context and 
delivery. Contextually, proactive aggression is aggression used with little or no direct 
provocation, with minimal physiological arousal, and is often calculated with specific 
goals in mind (e.g., bullying to gain status, or a preemptive military strike), whereas 
reactive aggression is usually initiated in response to a direct threat or insult, is 
characterized by high physiological arousal, and is impulsive (Bobadilla, Wampler, & 
Taylor, 2012). With respect to delivery, direct aggression is most often characterized by 
intimidation, threat, and physical violence, whereas indirect aggression is characterized 
by behaviors such as spreading rumors, gossiping, and social exclusion (Archer & Coyne, 
2005).  
On the status-acquisition-strategy continuum, the aggression we may think of 
stereotypically—physical violence—is admittedly at an extreme end. Within the toolbox 
of dominance-based status-seeking behavior there are slightly subtler options in the form 
of confrontation, threats, and coercion. But individuals may also instead choose to pursue 
status through the acquisition, demonstration, and sharing of skills or expertise. This 
variety of status acquisition strategies has fueled debate about how social rank, or status, 
is generally attained among people—through threats and violent physical contests, or 
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though generosity and commitment to the group (Anderson et al., 2006). Henrich & Gil-
White (2001) addressed this debate by answering: Both. Dominance is achieving status 
through force or threat of force, which is an ancient evolutionary inheritance observed in 
most nonhuman animals as well. Prestige is achieving status through the demonstration 
of knowledge or skill, which is thought to be a newer evolutionary adaptation specific to 
humans, and arose from the use of language and the cultural transmission of knowledge. 
Using dominance, status is taken; using prestige, status is conferred. Cheng and 
colleagues (2013) demonstrated that both strategies arise spontaneously and reliably, are 
judged quickly and accurately, and are successful pathways to status acquisition. It is 
important to note that individuals can adopt both strategies. When to use which strategy 
is thought to be a function of individual attributes and the social context (Cheng, Tracy, 
& Henrich, 2010). A small, timid, and physically weak individual is not advised to 
navigate a dominance pathway, due to personal attributes. But neither is a large, brash, 
and physically strong individual recommended to do so in a prestige-based hierarchy, due 
to social context. For example, there is evidence that demonstrates high levels of 
assertiveness, often interpreted as hostility, are predictive of status loss in a prestige-
based environment (Ames & Flynn, 2007). At the extreme, one might imagine the results 
of applying judo in a lively debate at an academic conference. If there are many paths to 
status acquisition, ranging from prosocial (e.g., demonstrating and sharing knowledge or 
skill) to antisocial (e.g., using intimidation or violence) then a question arises: When is 
aggression useful? 
At least as early as adolescence, individuals may choose any combination of the 
above types of aggression as a means to gaining and maintaining status. Sijtsema and 
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colleagues (2009) showed that, for example, the motivations of adolescent bullies are 
generally status related. Not only did bullies attach importance to status related goals, but 
also the victims attached significantly less value to such goals. There is also evidence that 
an aggression-based strategy for status acquisition can be relatively successful among 
adolescents. For example, Vaillancourt & Hymel (2006) demonstrated that among a large 
sample of adolescents, perceived popularity was highly associated with perceptions of 
dominance and power, and that directly and indirectly aggressive individuals were 
viewed as both popular and powerful. It is not entirely good news for the aggressors, 
however. Although aggressive individuals in both of the above examples were 
consistently rated as high in perceived popularity and power, they were also consistently 
rated lower on social preference. In addition, being a bully is predictive of many negative 
outcomes, including convictions of violent crime in early adulthood, self-reports of 
increased violent behavior, low job status, substance abuse, and an “unsuccessful life” in 
later adulthood (Farrington & Ttofi, 2011) as well antisocial personality and depressive 
and anxiety disorders (Sourander et al., 2007).  
Although there is evidence to suggest that younger individuals tolerate aggressive 
behaviors within their hierarchies more so than adults (Savin-Williams, 1980; Hawley, 
2002; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010), one only need give the news a cursory glance to 
see evidence of aggression among adults that often results from initially trivial disputes. 
In fact, the highest rates of homicide offenses are for individuals between the ages of 18 
to 34, with circumstances surrounding the homicide being an “argument” for 60.7% of 
offenders of the same age range (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). Given the risks of 
injury, ostracism, incarceration, retaliation, and other negative outcomes associated with 
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aggression, one may wonder why anyone would choose to employ such a strategy for 
status acquisition. However, consider research on “cultures of honor”. These are cultures 
that develop when the potential for theft of valuable resources is high and governing 
power is minimal or non-existent, in which an individual’s reputation for toughness and 
retributive violence is the primary deterrent of theft (Shackelford, 2005). In other words, 
in such cultures status is commonly acquired and maintained through intimidation and 
reactive, direct aggression. Yet once these high stakes conditions are addressed, such that 
the threat of theft is mitigated and more formal, legal recourse can be taken, the violence-
endorsing norms of the culture may persist.  
The southern United States is argued to be one example of a culture of honor. It is 
a region of consistently high levels of violent crime, even when controlling for other 
factors such as urbanization and socioeconomic status (Erlanger, 1976; Nisbett, 1993). 
Individuals from the region, particularly males, have been shown to endorse violence for 
self-defense and in defense of one’s honor more so than northerners (Cohen & Nisbett, 
1994), to demonstrate increased reactivity, aggression, and behavioral dominance in 
response to an insult (Cohen et al., 1996), and were more likely to perceive their peers as 
endorsing aggression as well as to overestimate peer aggression (Vandello, Cohen, & 
Ransom, 2008). Interestingly, Cohen & Nisbett (1997) showed that employers from The 
South were more likely to respond in an understanding way to job applicants who had 
allegedly killed someone in an honor related conflict, and southern newspapers were 
more likely to cover favorably a stabbing that resulted from a family insult. At least in 
part, aggression persists in these regions because individuals and institutions endorse it as 
a legitimate means to acquiring and maintaining status. 
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In short, social norms dictate the efficacy of a given strategy for status 
acquisition. There is evidence to suggest people are quite sensitive to hierarchy-relevant 
contextual cues and will often adjust their behavior accordingly. Social complexity and 
behavioral flexibility of this magnitude are likely unique to humans. This may explain 
why nonhuman animal models of status and aggression do not consistently extend to 
humans. If a male rat encounters a rival, he cannot choose to barter for goods or engage 
in heroic altruism to climb the social ladder. He can threaten, fight, or flee. Humans are 
not thus constrained and therefore have increased options for attaining status. They can 
vary their status-oriented behaviors based on social context. In high risk or competitive 
social contexts, for example, an individual may acquire status more readily through 
aggressive behaviors (Fischer & Mosquera, 2001; Waasdorp, Baker, Paskewich, & Leff, 
2012). In cooperative social contexts, the same individual may acquire status by curbing 
his or her aggressive tendencies or even by increasing pro-social behaviors (Hardy & Van 
Vugt, 2006). As such, it was hypothesized that when aggression was endorsed as a norm 
in the acquisition of status, then individuals would generally be more likely to engage in 
aggressive behavior. Conversely, to the extent that aggression was proscribed as a norm 
or led to status loss, then individuals would be less likely to engage in aggressive 
behavior. The extent to which another social variable, group membership, and a 
biological variable, 2D:4D, play roles in this behavioral plasticity will be discussed 
below. 
GROUPS, SEXES, AND BEHAVIOR 
From the earliest stages of human embryological development, the sexes are 
differentiated hormonally (for a review, see Knight & Mehta, 2014). Within the first few 
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weeks, androgens secreted from the testes facilitate the formation of internal and external 
male sex organs from previously undifferentiated tissues. In the absence of androgens 
female sex organs develop naturally. At puberty the pulsatile release of testosterone from 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis deepens the voice and increases muscle mass in 
males, and facilitates the growth of pubic hair in both sexes (though in females androgens 
are secreted primarily by the adrenal glands and ovaries). More relevant to this discussion 
is that androgens play an important role in mammalian brain development (Hines, 2006) 
and, consequently, in social behavior (Bos, Panksepp, Bluthé, & van Honk, 2012). As 
will be discussed in greater detail below, in humans specifically, normal variation in 
exposure to prenatal androgens has been linked to various postnatal sex differences 
(Hines, 2006). This prenatal exposure to androgens is also a contributing factor to the 
2D:4D development, and sex differences on 2D:4D are robust (see 2D:4D AND 
BEHAVIOR, below). 
However, among humans it is not clear to what extent these biological differences 
between sexes are associated with sex differences in social behavior. Indeed, regarding 
some social psychological phenomena, the extent to which there are sex differences is 
obscure. For example, having high status pays both immediate individual and long-term 
evolutionary dividends to males and females alike. As might be predicted, motivation to 
attain status has been observed in both sexes and is argued to be a universal human focus 
(Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). But to say that both sexes are motivated to seek 
status does not inform us as to whether they are motivated equally so, nor does it inform 
us as to whether they acquire it in similar ways.  
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It is widely acknowledged that males have increased access to social power 
(Carli, 1999). In a meta-analysis, Eagly and Karau (1991) showed that, generally, males 
emerged as leaders more often than females. Yet it would be premature to assume that 
since men more frequently occupy positions of high status then men must therefore desire 
status more. It would further be a mistake to assume that this ostensible increased desire 
is due to aforementioned biological differences. One empirical reason these assumptions 
are at best questionable is that social variables do considerable work in the allocation of 
status. Sex stereotypes are argued to play an ongoing role in undermining female status 
acquisition (Heilman, 2001). For example, Heilman and colleagues (2004) showed that, 
when men and women were presented for evaluation under ambiguous conditions, 
participants rated women as less competent and less achievement-oriented than men. 
These differences vanished when competence was made unambiguous; yet even when 
demonstrated as competent, women were far more personally derogated and less likely to 
be recommended for increased salary or job opportunities than men of equal competence. 
This effect was driven by what participants perceived to be violations of sex-stereotypic 
norms, suggesting that even competent females can be denied higher status due to 
considerations of social perception. Some implications from this example could be that 
women’s subjective desire for status is equal to men’s, but they may be less likely to 
express it behaviorally due to potential social costs. Further, status is often conferred by 
others, so even if status-motivated behavior is expressed by women, successful 
acquisition could be undermined by other members of the social hierarchy due to 
perceived violations of sex-stereotypic norms. In either case, the extent to which women 
acquire high status is a poor proxy of their motivation to do so.  
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If status acquisition measures are not particularly informative then what about 
measures of how status is subjectively valued? Again, we find ourselves in muddy 
waters. Sometimes measures suggest men value status more than women, and sometimes 
they do not (Huberman, Loch, & Önçüler, 2004; cf., Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001). 
These discrepancies may be due to sex differences, due to measurement differences, or 
both. Hays (2013) highlighted the importance of conceptual, and consequently, 
operational distinctions in investigating sex differences in social hierarchies. Arguing for 
a necessary distinction between status, i.e., the extent to which one is respected by others, 
and power, i.e., the control one has over valued resources, the author demonstrated that 
women valued status more than power and men valued power more than status. Further, 
men valued power more than women did, and women valued status more than men did. 
Future research highlighting such subtleties will hopefully elucidate any consistent sex 
differences in status valuation.  
One sex difference that appears less obfuscated is regarding group biases. Males 
tend to consistently show biases both to the in-group, which they tend to treat particularly 
benevolently under conditions of intergroup competition (Yamagishi & Mifune; 2009), 
and to the out-group, which they tend to treat particularly malevolently (Yuki, Yokota; 
2009). To account for these data, the Male Warrior Hypothesis (MWH) posits that 
evolutionary selection pressures on males have resulted in this increased likelihood of 
parochial altruism and coalitional aggression (Van Vugt, 2009; McDonald, Navarrete, & 
Van Vugt, 2012). Irrespective of sex, humans have a natural proclivity to categorize 
objects and individuals quite reflexively upon perception (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000). One of the “locations” other individuals are placed when using a categorizing 
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heuristics is in “group membership”. Given the many survival-relevant benefits of living 
in groups, it is no wonder that humans have evolved to be intensely social, value our in-
group, and have a strong need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Although this 
accounts for a tendency to value our in-group, it does not address the tendency of 
hostility toward the out-group, nor does it address why male coalitions are extremely 
overrepresented in intergroup conflict. As with all organisms, human sex differences are 
largely a function of evolutionary history, and thus, the differential cognitive traits and 
behaviors are specific to the slightly differing evolutionary trajectories of males and 
females. To unpack this warrants a brief aside to look at sexual selection.  
Sexual selection is a specific case of natural selection. Whereas, in natural 
selection organisms are “competing” against the environment (e.g., Darwin’s finches’ 
beaks becoming specialized to their diet, or long necks being selected for in giraffes to 
reach food located higher in trees), sexual selection is when organisms compete against 
other members of their species for access to mates (e.g., male gorillas’ larger size for 
competing against other males, or a peacock’s tail being used in courtship displays to 
attract females). Sexual selection arises largely due to differential parental investment 
between males and females, and often plays out in the following manner: Males 
maximize their reproductive rate, and thus their potential reproductive success, by 
minimizing their investment in parental care; yet, females are necessarily more invested 
parentally via the biological burden of carrying the developing fetus and, in many 
species, via extended postnatal care (Clutton-Brock, 2007). This disparity in parental 
investment leads to females being particular about their mate choices, which in turn leads 
to increased variance in male breeding success and therefore increased competition 
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among males, ultimately selecting for traits that increase the likelihood of competitive 
success (Trivers, 1972; Kirkpatrick, 1982; Clutton-Brock, 2007). One trait germane to 
this discussion is a proclivity toward aggression aimed at other men, particularly if those 
men are from another group (i.e., not members of an individuals in-group). Such a 
tendency toward coalitional violence is thought to enhance male reproductive success by 
(potentially) providing increased access to out-group females or, more indirectly, 
increased survival success of relatives, the elimination of same-sex rivals, and increased 
access to other resources (food, territory, etc.) that may be converted into status or power 
which, again, increases reproductive success (McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012). 
Interestingly, although putatively competing for access to females, men tend to be more 
concerned with the perspectives of other men regarding their perceived status, and less so 
with the perspectives of women (Fischer & Rodriguez-Mosquera, 2001; Griskevicius et 
al., 2009). This is likely an outcome arising from the aforementioned intrasexual 
competition in our evolutionary history.  
As of now, the state of knowledge about sex differences in status acquisition 
makes predicting and interpreting possible sex differences in status-related behavior a 
notable challenge. Including both sexes in studies manipulating status-relevant context, 
one risks the sex differences obscuring any real effects that might otherwise be revealed 
by including males or females exclusively. Should certain effects be found in one sex but 
not the other then one’s sample size is effectively cut in half. This is particularly crippling 
since effect sizes in social psychological studies tend to be smaller and many studies are 
already underpowered. As such, the current study focused on an exclusively male sample, 
using the MWH to inform potential interactions between 2D:4D (discussed in the 
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following section) and the effect of group membership on economic decision-
making/aggressive behavior. That is, it was hypothesized that participants would 
generally behave more aggressively toward out-group members, and this effect would be 
most notable among those with more masculinized (lower) 2D:4D.  
2D:4D AND BEHAVIOR 
The road linking individual differences in prenatal brain androgenization to 
individual differences in human cognition and behavior is undoubtedly serpentine, often 
proving just consistent enough to be enticing. How psychologists measure prenatal brain 
androgenization in adults and our understanding of its role in development is thankfully a 
bit more consistent. An exhaustive list of the roles androgens play developmentally is 
beyond the scope of this paper, however a brief overview of some key details is 
necessary. As has been observed by many, nature’s default setting when constructing an 
organism is female. Another way of saying this is that a hormonal “intervention” is 
required to get a male, and this is one of the first roles androgens accomplish: Once the 
testes develop from undifferentiated gonads, they secrete androgens that begin to 
masculinize undifferentiated tissues (Smith, Birnie, & French, 2013). That is, tissues that 
would naturally develop into labia in the absence of androgens, now in the presence of 
androgens develop into a scrotum instead; tissues that would naturally develop into a 
clitoris instead develop into a penis (Arnold, 2009). Yet in mammalian development 
androgens play a role beyond the differentiation of external genitalia, hence prenatal 
brain androgenization.  
It is important to note that although early on the testes are the primary source of 
androgens in a developing male, they are not the only source. Nor are developing females 
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isolated from androgen exposure. In females the ovaries can secrete androgens and, in 
both males and females, androgens are also secreted by the adrenal glands. Further, in 
utero a developing organism may be exposed to other sources of androgens, such as those 
secreted by the mother or a twin, or those acquired from external environmental sources 
(Smith, Birnie, & French, 2013). These differences and dynamics play an important role 
in mammalian brain development (Hines, 2006) and, consequently, in social behavior 
(Bos, Panksepp, Bluthé, & van Honk, 2012). In both non-human and human primates, for 
example, there is a robust relationship between prenatal androgens and sexually 
differentiated behavior (Wallen, 2005; Cohen-Bendahan, van de Beek, & Berenbaum, 
2005; Manson, 2008). In humans, normal variation in exposure to prenatal androgens has 
also been linked to postnatal sex differences in eye contact, vocabulary development, and 
sex-typed behavior such as toy preferences (Hines, 2006) and, though mixed, there is 
evidence for individual differences in aggression (Manson, 2008). One peculiar feature of 
differences in prenatal androgen exposure is their relationship to differences in finger 
length ratios—specifically, the ratio between the second digit (the index finger) and the 
fourth digit (the ring finger), also known as the 2D:4D ratio. Perhaps surprisingly, among 
psychologists this ratio has become a standard measure of exposure to prenatal 
androgens.  
How this counterintuitive relationship was established is rather circuitous. In an 
early study, Manning and colleagues (1998) observed that the Hox gene family is 
requisite for limb, genital, and testes development and, citing previous animal studies 
associating digit abnormalities with genital abnormalities, they suggested that digit 
growth might be related to fertility. They highlighted the variability in the human 2D:4D 
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ratio and, in two studies, they presented evidence of sex differences in the 2D:4D ratio, 
showed that these sex differences were apparent in children as young as two years old, 
and demonstrated that in men a lower sperm count and lower sperm motility was 
associated with a higher (i.e., more feminine) 2D:4D ratio (Manning, Scutt, Wilson, & 
Lewis-Jones, 1998). Since previous evidence showed that androgen concentrations affect 
the rate of development (McEwen, 1981, MacLusky and Naftolin, 1981, Bardin and 
Catterall, 1981, Geschwind and Galaburda, 1985), and since hand asymmetry was 
correlated with testosterone levels in adult males (which themselves were associated with 
prenatal androgen levels; Jamison et al., 1993), and since evidence for sex differences in 
the 2D:4D ratio appeared so early on, Manning and colleagues argued the following: 1) 
The 2D:4D ratio was likely determined prenatally. 2) Hox gene-regulated androgens 
secreted by the testes starting at roughly 8 weeks until mid-gestation affect digit 
development. 3) Higher concentrations of fetal testosterone led to a low 2D:4D ratio. 4) 
Therefore, prenatal testicular activity (or perhaps more accurately, prenatal testosterone 
activity) is correlated with the 2D:4D ratio.  
To be clear, Manning and colleagues’ conclusions were that a lower 2D:4D ratio 
is associated with exposure to higher levels of prenatal androgens, whereas a higher 
2D:4D ratio is associated with exposure to lower levels of prenatal androgens. Over time 
much evidence has accumulated in support of their conclusions. Indeed, sex differences 
in 2D:4D are one of the variable’s most consistent features, such that males generally 
have lower 2D:4D ratios than females; these differences consistently appear early and are 
unaffected by pubertal growth; high amniotic testosterone-to-estradiol ratios predict low 
2D:4D; and females affected by congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH; a condition in 
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which females are prenatally exposed to atypically high levels of androgens) have lower 
2D:4D than control females (McIntyre, 2006). Further, males with androgen insensitivity 
syndrome (AIS) show a higher (feminized) 2D:4D relative to typical males (Berenbaum, 
Bryk, Nowak, Quigley, & Moffat, 2008), and 2D:4D has been correlated with sensitivity 
to testosterone via androgen receptors (Manning, Bundred, Newton, & Flanagan, 2003; 
although, admittedly this latter detail has come under notable scrutiny recently, Voracek, 
2014). 
There is a seemingly ever-growing consensus that 2D:4D is a proxy of prenatal 
androgen exposure, but admittedly it is not unanimous. Even in the above cited work 
showing supporting evidence for males with AIS having larger 2D:4D, Berenbaum and 
colleagues (2008) argued that the effect was small enough and the data was noisy enough 
that they were not convinced 2D:4D is a good marker of individual differences in 
exposure to prenatal androgens. Regarding mechanisms, although McIntyre (2006) 
provided evidence of how androgens could affect digit growth—via androgen receptors 
found in anlagen or metaphyseal tissue, for example—there is little direct evidence yet 
showing they do. Manning (2011) pointed out that this sex difference in 2D:4D exists 
across many mammalian species and also reviewed experimental evidence of the effect 
that the prenatal testosterone-to-estrogen ratio has on digit development in mice. In short, 
it seems that the 4th digit is particularly sensitive to this ratio, such that androgens 
increased growth while estrogen decreased growth, and similar to human results, this was 
most notable on the right paw (Zheng & Cohn, 2011). Again, there is a consensus that 
such a relationship between prenatal androgen exposure and 2D:4D exists, as well as 
some limited supporting evidence of mechanisms; but in candor, much of the evidence 
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supporting this relationship is indirect and leans on phenotypic patterns and peripheral 
markers of brain androgenization and sex differences, via associated traits and behaviors. 
So with what traits and behaviors is 2D:4D associated?  
As mentioned, higher 2D:4D was associated with lower fertility in males 
(Manning, Scutt, Wilson, & Lewis-Jones,1998). It is frequently correlated with physical 
fitness in both males and females (Hönekopp, Manning, & Miller, 2006) and in males it 
has been linked to the number of sexual partners an individual has had (Hönekopp, 
Voracek, & Manning, 2005). It has shown (weak) associations with personality traits 
such as extraversion and openness to experience (Lippa, 2006) and it has also been 
correlated with attention deficit disorder, eating disorders, sexual orientation (in women 
but not in men), autism, risk taking, and aggression (Breedlove, 2010), as well as spatial 
navigation (Csatho, et al., 2003), verbal and numerical intelligence, and agreeableness 
(Luxen & Buunk, 2004). And this is a truncated overview. This bizarre laundry list of 
relationships appears nearly random, at a glance. However, there may be a theme to be 
extracted. As a reminder, 2D:4D is thought to be a proxy of exposure to prenatal 
androgens, and variance in exposure to prenatal androgens is a potent predictor of sex 
differences. Again, human sex differences are largely a function of our evolutionary 
history and thus, it is argued, 2D:4D is—or at least should be—associated with cognitive 
traits and behaviors specific to the slightly differing evolutionary trajectories of males 
and females discussed previously. With this in mind, and referring back to what larger 
amounts of prenatal androgens accomplish—namely, masculinizing a developing 
organism—then the swarm of relationships between 2D:4D and various traits begins to 
look like a pattern of relationships one might expect between prenatal androgenization 
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and male-typical traits. That is, it should not be as surprising to see lower 2D:4D 
associated with fertility, physical fitness, increased sexual partners, risk-taking, 
aggression, and so on.  
Yet again it should be noted that although this interpretation represents the 
consensus it is not without issues, in part due to inconsistent data. For example, after 
reviewing the various findings associated with 2D:4D, Putz and colleagues (2004) looked 
at a total of 57 possible correlations between 2D:4D and relevant variables (e.g., number 
of sexual partners, social and physical dominance) and found only two significant 
correlations in the predicted direction. They also highlighted that previous significant 
results may not be as impressive as they appear at first glance due to the variability in 
measurement of 2D:4D. That is, across multiple studies, and often within the same study, 
both the left and right hand measurements are used in the analyses, in addition to the 
mean of the two, as well as the difference between the two (right minus left). Add another 
5 or 6 variables of interest, as social psychologists are often wont to do, and one rapidly 
increases the likelihood of Type I errors (Putz et al., 2004). Yet, as of 2009 there were 
over 300 papers documenting relationships between 2D:4D and various traits and 
behaviors, with many going in predicted directions albeit sometimes inconsistently 
(Vorcek & Loibl, 2009). Methodological issues are always a legitimate concern, but it 
seems unlikely that the entirety of those studies plus those performed since 2009 all 
amalgamate to an embarrassing aggregate of Type I errors.  
No doubt there are many factors leading to some of the inconsistencies in the 
2D:4D literature, ranging from methodological muddiness to sample size issues, given 
the demonstrated small effect size estimates of 2D:4D on behavior (for example, see 
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Hönekopp & Watson, 2010). One factor may be more theoretical. Take for example a 
relationship relevant to this discussion, the one often found between 2D:4D and 
aggression. It has proven to be somewhat disorderly. 2D:4D has been correlated with 
aggression far more often in men but not women (Bailey & Hurd, 2005; Kuepper & 
Hennig, 2007; Hönekopp, 2011); however, it should be noted that at least once it has 
been correlated with reactive aggression in women but not men (Benderlioglu & Nelson, 
2004), and it correlated with both sexes regarding retaliatory aggression (Ronay & 
Galinsky, 2011). Yet sometimes no relationship is found, particularly when using self-
report measures of aggression.  
One theoretical approach to make sense of inconsistencies in the literature comes 
from Millet (2010). Looking at nascent relationships between 2D:4D and economic 
decision making, Millet reviewed similar inconsistencies and suggested that 2D:4D is 
perhaps better thought of as being associated with context-specific behaviors, rather than 
as a stable trait producing predictable, homogenous behaviors across all situations. 
Drawing from empirical data, Millet makes a comparison to the narrative regarding 
testosterone. Once thought to be associated with aggression, testosterone (and 
particularly, testosterone dynamics) more recently has been found to be more strongly 
associated with status and status-seeking/maintaining behavior, rather than aggression per 
se (Mazur & Booth, 1998; Archer, 2006; Eisenegger, Haushofer, & Fehr, 2011; Carré & 
Olmstead, 2015). Similarly, Millet argues, low 2D:4D may be a biological marker of 
those motivated by status acquisition. The argument is supported by studies that show, 
for example, that low 2D:4D individuals are more likely to act prosocially under neutral 
conditions, but under conditions of threat they behave less prosocially, with the opposite 
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effect being true for high 2D:4D individuals (Millet & Dewitte, 2009). Low 2D:4D men 
show more aversion to risk than high 2D:4D men under conditions of high power 
(suggesting a preference for the status quo), whereas under conditions of low power, low 
2D:4D men become more risk seeking (Millet & Dewitte, 2008). These are conditional 
behaviors contingent upon context, rather than rigid programs applied uniformly to all 
situations. As outlined above, humans use many tools for status acquisition. Aggression 
is one of them. So aggression may be associated with 2D:4D only insofar as aggression is 
being used under conditions relevant to status acquisition and maintenance.  
Social psychology is the study of minds colliding with the environment, and the 
human social environment often consists of differing groups with differing norms, many 
of which we have to navigate daily. If successfully adhering to those differing norms is 
an essential feature of acquiring status, and if 2D:4D is a biological marker of status-
motivation, then it stands to reason that 2D:4D would be associated with aggression (and 
other status-relevant behaviors) in a situation-contingent manner. As such, it was 
predicted that low 2D:4D individuals would be more sensitive to status-relevant cues and 
therefore more likely to adjust their behavior accordingly, such that they would comprise 
the most aggressive individuals under conditions in which their cohorts endorsed 
aggression as a means to gaining/maintaining status, but would comprise the least 
aggressive individuals under conditions in which aggression would result in status loss.  
THE ULTIMATUM GAME AND AGGRESSION  
 The Ultimatum Game is broadly used as a social economic decision making task, 
particularly as it pertains to perceptions of unfair treatment (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, 
Lieberman, & Robbins, 2008; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; 
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Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Based on this, it 
could be rightly argued that the rejection of low offers is solely a rational reaction to 
perceived injustice. That is, participants may be saying, “My rejection is not meant to 
harm you. I simply require a ‘fair’ offer before I am willing to accept.” It could also be 
argued, however, that rejection of the offer is a measure of aggression, per se. That is, 
participants may be saying, “My rejection of this offer is meant to harm you. If I do not 
get what I want then I will make sure no one gets anything.” There is evidence to support 
this latter notion as well. High trait aggression has been associated with a higher rate of 
offer rejection (Mehta, 2007), and participants have reported feeling angry or insulted 
after receiving unfair offers (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996). This need not be an “either/or” scenario. It is possible that some 
people use rejection with aggressive intent and some people use it otherwise. Therefore, 
this study cast a broad net with respect to the dependent variable (i.e., social economic 
decision-making); however, in order to look at aggressive intent specifically, a series of 
questions were developed to ask participants after they had made their decision to accept 
or reject an offer. Answers to those questions were meant to provide data that help tease 
out aggressive intent from other intentions and provide a basis to understand what 
variables may influence aggression. 
CURRENT STUDY 
The human brain is the most complicated structure in the known universe, so it is 
not surprising that human behavior is some of the most complex, variable, and 
unpredictable behavior among all known species. Social behavior is the collision of two 
or more human brains within a highly dynamic environment of resources and context. 
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Add in evolutionary history, hormones, developmental diversity, sociological influences, 
biological/environmental interactions, etc., and understanding human social behavior 
quickly starts to look like an overwhelmingly intimidating and perhaps impossible task. 
Extreme complexity is not a problem specific to social science. Historically, one way in 
which philosophers and scientists have managed complexity is to “carve nature at its 
joints”, making demarcations within the chaos. These demarcations are sometimes 
arbitrary or artificial. Even so, they are useful and even necessary to lay a foundation of 
assumptions on which to build structures of knowledge. Simple, distinct variables are laid 
out and basic relationships between those variables are observed and defined. More 
complicated models come later and, occasionally, a more sophisticated understanding is 
used to reinterpret previous “fundamental” assumptions. Sometimes these fundamental 
assumptions do not survive the reinterpretation, and the scaffolding is removed while the 
structure yet remains.  
The relationship between an individual’s aggressive behavior and an individual’s 
second-to-fourth digit ratio typifies the aforementioned complexity of human social 
behavior and associated biological variables. Two variables were carved at the joints and 
tentative, simple, and even surprising relationships between them have been explored. 
However these relationships have proven inconsistent, perhaps owing to methodological 
issues but also perhaps owing to oversimplified models of human behavior. Like 
testosterone, 2D:4D may be a correlate of aggressive behavior but not in a linear fashion 
(i.e., lower 2D:4D always equals more aggression). Instead, there may be moderating 
effects of context. The goal of this study was to propose and test such a model. So far we 
have reviewed the tools for gaining status, with a particular focus on aggression; the 
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effects of norms on status acquisition and maintenance; male biases with regards to intra- 
and intergroup dynamics; and the 2D:4D measurement as a proxy of exposure to prenatal 
androgens. The current study attempted to place all these variables into a model 
predicting the rejection rate in the Ultimatum Game, with an eye on that rejection as an 
act of aggression. As such, there are multiple a priori hypotheses to test.  
 In this study we measured participants’ 2D:4D. We then assigned them to teams 
and led them to believe they were interacting with teammates. Those teammates either 
endorsed aggression as a means to gaining status, were neutral about aggression as a 
means to gaining status, or proscribed aggression as a means to gaining status. This is the 
aggression-for-status norm manipulation. After meeting their teammates and being 
exposed to their group norms, participants were told they would be interacting with either 
one of those teammates, or with a member from a rival team (against whom they would 
allegedly be competing later). This was the in-group vs. out-group manipulation. The 
interaction was one round of the Ultimatum Game. This was the dependent variable. 
After the round of the Ultimatum Game, participants were asked a variety of questions in 
an attempt to unpack their reasoning and intent behind their decision to accept or reject 
the unfair offer. For main effects, it was hypothesized that 1) individuals in the pro-
aggression condition would be more likely to reject the unfair offer than those individuals 
in the neutral or anti-aggression condition, and 2) individuals interacting with a rival 
would be more likely to reject an unfair offer than individuals interacting with a 
teammate.  
However, hypotheses regarding interactions are at the heart of this study. 1) If 
2D:4D denotes a predisposition toward status concerns then lower 2D:4D individuals 
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should be more sensitive to such information and more likely to adjust their behavior 
accordingly. Therefore it was hypothesized that individuals with low 2D:4D would be the 
most likely to reject unfair offers when in the pro-aggression condition, but the least 
likely to reject unfair offers in the anti-aggression condition. 2) As per the MWH (that is, 
in times of out-group threat—the pending competition—males tend to engage in out-
group aggression and in-group cooperation), it was predicted that low 2D:4D individuals 
would be more likely to reject an unfair offer from a rival, and more likely to accept an 
unfair offer from a teammate, than high 2D:4D individuals. 3) The potential interaction 
between the aggression-for-status norm variable and the in-group vs. out-group variable 
was less clear. It could be that endorsing aggression as a means for gaining status implied 
a carte blanche application. That is, being aggressive was interpreted as good both when 
interacting with teammates as well as interacting with rivals. Here we might think of a 
team or business in which competition for positions or status is intense among teammates 
as well as competition being intense between teams or businesses. However, it might be 
interpreted as only applicable to interacting with rivals. A more cohesive and stable group 
that only reacts aggressively to outside threats might capture this latter response. 
Although agnostic about this interaction, I leaned toward the latter outcome being most 
likely—individuals in the pro-aggression condition would be particularly likely to reject 
an unfair offer when interacting with a rival than those individuals in the anti-aggression 
condition. That is, any effect of aggression endorsement would be maximal, or perhaps 
even only visible, among those interacting with a rival. 4) There is also a possibility of a 
three-way interaction. If 2D:4D is a measure of both a masculinized brain as well as an 
indication of status-orientation, then according to the MWH a masculinized brain should 
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be particularly aggressive toward out-group individuals and particularly prosocial toward 
in-group members, and status-oriented individuals should be most in tune to, and most 
likely to adjust their behavior to, status-relevant context. It was therefore hypothesized 
that low 2D:4D individuals in the pro-aggression condition, interacting with a rival, 
should be among the most likely to reject an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game; 
whereas, low 2D:4D individuals in the anti-aggression condition interacting with a 
teammate should be among the least likely to reject an unfair offer.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
Participants: 609 male participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and 
were paid $3.00 for 20-30 minutes of their time. Ages ranged from 18-65 (M = 30.25, SD 
= 9.24). The demographic information breaks down as follows: Reported ethnicities were 
64.5% European American, 10.0% Hispanic Latino, 8.2% African American, 7.1% Asian 
Pacific Islander, 1.1% Native American, 10.0% Other. Reported native languages were 
95.9% English, 1.6% Spanish, 0.3% French, 0.2% Chinese, 2.0% Other. Reported sexual 
orientation was 86% heterosexual, 7.9% homosexual, 4.8% bisexual, 1.3% Other.  
Materials and Procedure:  
Recruitment, 2D:4D, and Demographics: Participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $3.00 for 20-30 minutes of their time. Once accepting 
the job, participants were directed to Qualtrics and filtered for biological sex. The first 
question they encountered asked their sex. If they answered “female” then they were 
redirected to a prompt thanking them for their time but informing them they were not 
eligible to continue. (IP addresses were checked for redundancy to ensure individuals 
were not returning, changing their response, and thus faking their sex in order to 
participate.) If they answered “male” then they were presented with a screen briefly 
describing the demands of the study and requesting they set aside the requisite time to 
complete everything without disturbance. They were then presented with a consent form. 
Once they read the form and agreed to participate in the study, they were asked to upload 
pictures of both their right and left hands (individually). The process required that they 
hold their hands up horizontally in front of a unique background on the computer screen. 
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They then took a picture of their hand with their smartphone, sent the picture to their 
email, downloaded the file to their desktop, and then uploaded the picture to the Qualtrics 
survey. Though measures of 2D:4D acquired via smartphone are not yet “standard”, there 
is precedent for acquiring measures in this way (Huang, Basanta, & Sandnes, 2015).   
 Following the pictures, participants took the Dominance-Prestige survey (Cheng, 
Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) and were then asked to respond to a variety of demographic 
questions. Upon completion of the questions, participants then read a more detailed 
overview of the study and were told they were part of a study investigating the nature of 
online, indirect interactions and how the indirect nature of interactions affects the ability 
of individuals to form and function as a team. They were told they would be connected to 
the study’s online network, placed on a team based on a software algorithm, and then 
they would get to know their teammates in indirect ways. They were told that eventually 
they and their teammates would compete against another team in an (undisclosed) online 
competition. Once the “familiarizing” process was completed, they were told that they 
would interact with either a randomly selected teammate or a randomly selected member 
of the rival team. The results of those interactions, they were told, would be made visible 
to their teammates. They were told that these results should be used to inform them as to 
whom they would like to elect as team leader. They were informed that the team leader 
would decide how to allocate the winnings acquired in the team-on-team competition, 
should their team win, and that would be the end of the study. 
 Much of this was not true, however, and was a cover story intended to achieve 
many experimental goals. The other teammates were not real and instead were 
predetermined responses. This was necessary for the “aggression-for-status” norm 
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manipulation, ensuring teammates were either pro-aggression, neutral about aggression, 
or anti-aggression. The other rival members were not real and the online competition 
never took place. This was the cover story necessary to generate the need for teams. That 
is, it created the incentive to care about what others thought (“my teammates” as opposed 
to interacting with random internet strangers), allowed the possibility of manipulating 
group norms, and it facilitated the in-group/out-group manipulation (that is, everyone is 
an “out-group” member in the absence of teams). The team leader election never took 
place, either. This deception was also used to accomplish a couple ends. First, it created a 
drive for status since all individuals felt they had an opportunity to become leader (if they 
wanted). By telling participants that the leader would decide how winnings would be 
shared, any potential status jostling was enhanced by further incentivizing the team leader 
position. Second, it ensured that participants’ felt their behavior in the interaction would 
be observed by group members and (presumably) evaluated based on group norms. That 
is, manipulating group norms to observe their potential effects on behavior would make 
no sense if that behavior was believed to be confidential and had no possible 
repercussions within the group.   
Aggression-for-Status Norm Manipulation: Upon being told about the overview of the 
(alleged) procedure of the study, participants were placed on a team. A screen came up 
that told them that their team placement was decided by a computer algorithm and was 
based on their geographic location combined with their demographics. They were then 
given directions about how they would get to know their teammates indirectly by first 
reading some vignettes and then responding to some follow-up statements about the 
vignettes. Unbeknownst to them, participants were randomly assigned (via Qualtrics 
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software) to either a pro-aggression condition, in which the participant’s teammates 
appeared to endorse aggressive behavior as a means to gaining status; a neutral condition, 
in which teammate’s appeared ambivalent about aggression as a means to gaining status; 
or an anti-aggression condition, in which teammate’s appeared to reject aggressive 
behavior as a means to gaining status.  
The vignettes were identical for all groups (pro, neutral, and anti). Each vignette 
consisted of a fictional “John” character interacting with other individuals (John’s friends 
and others) in a hypothetical situation that ultimately resulted in him engaging in 
aggressive behavior in a social setting (see supplemental materials for all vignettes). The 
vignettes were designed from scratch and were intentionally constructed to convey acts of 
aggression in varying social contexts. That is, an act of in-group aggression, which is to 
say status jostling between members of an in-group (vignette 1); an act of out-group 
aggression, which is to say coalitional aggression between two explicit rival groups 
(vignette 2); and aggression in a situation absent any salient in-group/out-group cues, 
which is to say an act of aggression toward a “random” stranger not explicitly thought to 
be in a rival out-group (vignette 3). After each vignette, participants in all three groups 
were exposed to the same three statements:  
1) “If John wanted his friends to respect him then his behavior would work.”  
2) “If John wanted his friends to like him then his behavior would work.”  
3) “If John wanted his friends to view him as a leader then his behavior would 
work.” These three statements were meant to capture status-relevant details in a broad 
manner, as status may consist of social preference, respect, and/or leadership. Participants 
were eventually asked to select from answers that were on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging 
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from “Completely Agree” to “Completely Disagree”. In the pro-aggression norm group, 
the participant’s teammates responded with either “Mostly Agree” or “Completely 
Agree”. In the neutral group, the teammates responded with “I am undecided”, 
“Somewhat Agree”, or “Somewhat Disagree”. In the anti-aggression norm group, the 
teammate’s responded with “Mostly Disagree” or “Completely Disagree”. However, 
there was concern that by allowing participants to answer first (i.e., before their 
teammates), they may be more inclined to “dig in” and defend their perspective if it 
differed from their teammates. That could create an artificial barrier to normative 
influence on behavior later in the UG. Whereas, if they answered last then there may be 
more variability in their responses and, perhaps, in their subsequent behavior, which 
would better facilitate measuring the effect that aggression-for-status relevant group 
norms have on behavior (if any). Therefore, just prior to reading the vignettes and 
responding to the aforementioned statements, participants were told they were randomly 
selected to respond last. There were three vignettes total with a series of three subsequent 
statements (see above) following each vignette.  
The participant response to the vignette also serendipitously provided another 
dependent measure. While the primary dependent measure was behavior in the UG, the 
participant’s response to the statements following the vignette allowed investigation into 
whether the participants’ evaluation of John’s behavior would vary as a function of the 
team to which they were assigned. If there were no influence of team norms, via their 
teammate responses, then there should not be any differences in the participants’ 
responses between the conditions since the vignettes were identical across groups and 
only the team norms differed. However, if the team norms influenced the participants 
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(irrespective of whether such norms later influenced participant behavior in the UG) then 
participant responses should follow the pattern of team assignment. That is, participants 
in the pro-aggression-for-status norm condition should be more likely to respond in a way 
that approves of John’s aggressive behavior and those in the anti-aggression-for-status 
norm condition should respond in a way that proscribes John’s aggressive behavior. Pilot 
data consisting of 100 participants did indeed yield significant differences in responses to 
these statements based on norm condition, implying a potentially successful 
manipulation. 
Group Manipulation: After being exposed to the team norms regarding aggression for 
status acquisition, participants then engaged in one round of the Ultimatum Game (UG). 
They were told, “Now you will be randomly connected with either a fellow teammate or 
a rival from another team that you will compete against later.” (Qualtrics randomly 
assigned them to either the teammate or rival condition.) After a moment, participants 
were told, “You have been connected to a Rival.” (Or in the case of being assigned to a 
teammate: “You have been connected to a Teammate”.)  
Primary Dependent Variable: Participants then went through the UG instructions and 
answered some follow-up questions to ensure they understood the procedure. They were 
told that they would be looking to acquire tickets and the more tickets they acquired, the 
more likely they would be to win a $50.00 gift card. Once the directions were read and 
participants were told with whom they would be interacting, either a teammate or a rival 
made an offer that consisted of 2 out of 10 possible tickets (i.e., if the participant 
accepted then they would receive two tickets and the teammate/rival would keep 8 
tickets). Participants were then asked to make their decision to accept or reject.  
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Manipulation and Suspicion Checks. Participants were asked a series of questions 
throughout the procedure that were meant to be manipulation checks for the norm 
manipulation. After the vignettes, but before the UG interaction, participants were asked 
whether they felt their teammates valued dominance, compassion, fairness, aggression, or 
compliance, in order to increase status (again, answers were on a 7-point Likert scale). 
These questions were meant to ensure participants understood their team’s norms 
regarding status acquisition. Separately, there was the possibility that, in seeing their 
teammates’ responses to the statements following the vignettes, participants might feign 
agreement with John’s aggressive behavior, for example if they were in the pro-
aggression condition, but still not behave aggressively later in the UG. This might be due 
to a willingness to signal acquiescence to group norms while not necessarily agreeing 
with them, which could in turn affect one’s willingness to let such norms affect one’s 
actual behavior in a more applied setting when stakes are higher (i.e., regarding their 
decision to accept or reject the UG offer). To address this, participants were also asked 
the extent to which they related to their teammates. This was hoped to help interpret null 
results. That is, if the norm manipulation failed to affect behavior in the UG, might it be 
due to participants’ inability to relate to their teammates (or at least their team’s norms)? 
Following their decision in the UG, participants were asked a variety of questions 
about their perception of the offer they received (was it fair/unfair? 
Respectful/disrespectful? Generous/greedy? Friendly/aggressive?), questions about their 
decision (same as above: Was it fair/unfair, respectful/disrespectful, generous/greedy, 
friendly/aggressive?), as well as questions about their affect: Did the offer make them 
feel calm/bothered, upbeat/dejected, friendly/angry? All answers were also on a 7-point 
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Likert scale (e.g., 1 = friendly, 7 = aggressive). These questions were asked in 
anticipation of “unpacking” any effects on the DV. That is, what about the offer 
contributed most to their decision to accept/reject? For example, did they reject more so 
because they perceived the offer as unfair, or rather did they reject more so because it 
was perceived as intentionally aggressive or disrespectful? Ultimately, why did they 
accept/reject the offer? Was it that they felt, for example, to reject an unfair offer was the 
fair thing to do, irrespective of the intent of the person making the offer? Or rather did 
they intentionally mean their rejection to be an act of aggression? The affective state of 
the participant might be informative as well. For example, we might expect those who 
rejected due to issues of “fairness” to perhaps rate their feelings as less “angry” than 
individuals who rejected due to issues of “aggression” or “disrespect”, etc. All of these 
worked together as a way to probe whether rejection of an unfair offer in the UG can be 
considered an act of aggression. 
Also after their decision to accept or reject, they were asked with whom did they 
just compete, to ensure they understood whether it was a teammate or a rival. They were 
also asked three questions about whether they thought their teammates would approve of 
their decision. Specifically, they were asked, “If you wanted your teammates to respect 
you then your decision to accept/reject would work,” “If you wanted your teammates to 
like you then your decision to accept/reject would work,” and, “If you wanted your 
teammates to view you as a leader then your decision to accept/reject would work”. This 
was meant to estimate whether the effect, if any, of the aggression-for-status norm 
manipulation was still having an effect this late into the experiment. They were also 
asked about how many tickets they expected to be offered. The scale of answers to this 
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question was the only one that deviated from a 7-point Likert scale. It ranged from 0 to 
10, capturing all possible offers of 10 available tickets. 
The final questions before the study concluded were opportunities for participants 
to provide any feedback or observations about the study. Specifically, it was an 
opportunity for participants to express any suspicions they might have had about the 
procedure. They were asked to, “Please briefly share any interesting 
thoughts/observations/experiences you may have had while participating in this study 
thus far.” Then they were asked, “What did you think of the Proposer-Responder 
interaction?” (The “Proposer-Responder interaction” was the Ultimatum Game.) 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Quality Control: Data was acquired from 609 males. Of those, participants who showed 
skepticism in the outgoing survey questions were removed prior to analyses. 
Additionally, some individuals did not provide pictures of their hands, one individual 
wore gloves (making 2D:4D measurement impossible), and a few individuals provided 
double pictures of one hand (two lefts or two rights), and were therefore excluded. These 
exclusions resulted in 572 participants. These participants were used in all subsequent 
analyses unless otherwise noted. Digit ratios for the left and right hands were 
significantly correlated (r = 0.54, p < 0.001). Further, digit ratios for both hands were 
normally distributed (right hand: Mean = 0.98, SD = 0.06; left hand: Mean = 0.98, SD = 
0.07). Despite pictures being acquired online, the aforementioned data suggested 
acceptable quality of 2D:4D data. (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics and Table 2 for 
intercorrelations between study variables.) Regarding overall ultimatum game results, 
262 participants (45.8%) accepted the offer of two tickets, while 310 participants (54.2%) 
rejected it.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for study variables 
Variables Mean (SD) Minimum Maximum 
Age 30.14 (9.07) 18.00 65.00 
Prestige 46.59 (7.90) 9.00 63.00 
Dominance 28.09 (7.28) 8.00 50.00 
Right 2D:4D 0.98 (0.06) 0.70 1.23 
Left 2D:4D 0.98 (0.07) 0.70 1.26 
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Team values 
dominance 
3.98 (2.33) 1 7 
Team values 
compassion 
3.78 (1.96) 1 7 
Team values  
fairness 
4.03 (1.82) 1 7 
Team values 
aggression 
4.03 (2.34) 1 7 
Team values 
compliance 
3.76 (1.77) 1 7 
Relate to team 4.13 (1.90) 1 7 
Team respect me for 
my decision 
4.76 (1.71) 1 7 
Team like me for my 
decision 
4.42 (1.86) 1 7 
Team view me as a 
leader for my 
decision 
4.81 (1.73) 1 7 
Vignette 1, endorse 
aggression 
3.47 (1.83) 1 7 
Vignette 2, endorse 
aggression 
2.66 (1.67) 1 7 
Vignette 3, endorse 
aggression 
3.11 (1.84) 1 7 
Offer was fair vs. 
unfair 
5.98 (1.22) 1 7 
Offer was respectful 
vs. disrespectful 
5.84 (1.66) 1 7 
Offer was generous 
vs. greedy 
6.32 (0.89) 1 7 
Offer was friendly 
vs. aggressive 
5.83 (1.10) 1 7 
Decision was fair vs. 
unfair 
2.24 (1.46) 1 7 
Decision was 
respectful vs. 
disrespectful 
3.06 (1.72) 1 7 
Decision was 
generous vs. greedy 
3.07 (1.69) 1 7 
Decision was 
friendly vs. 
aggressive 
3.68 (2.00) 1 7 
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Table 2. Zero-order correlations between study variables 
 
Note: *p  < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1. Age -
2. Prestige -0.13* -
3. Dominance -0.01 0.02 -
4. Right 2D4D 0.15** 0.05 0.03 -
5. Left 2D4D 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.61** -
6. Team: Dominance 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.06 -
7. Team: Compassion -0.12* 0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.72** -
8. Team: Fairness -0.13* 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.52** 0.68** -
9. Team: Aggression 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.92** -0.72** -0.55** -
10. Team: Submission -0.12* 0.08 0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.51** 0.61** 0.50** -0.50** -
11. Relate to Team -0.14* 0.12* -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.44** 0.56** 0.55** -0.46** 0.37** -
12. Team Respect 0.07 0.12* 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.07 -
13. Team Like 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.12* 0.42** -
14. Team Leader 0.09 0.18** 0.08 -0.01 -.010 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.65** 0.44** -
15. Offer Unfair -0.01 0.21** 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.12* 0.07 0.20** -
16. Offer Disrespectful -0.03 0.13* 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.11* 0.03 0.18** 0.51** -
17. Offer Greedy -0.03 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.06 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.15** 0.03 0.12* 0.49** 0.58** -
18. Offer Aggressive 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.11 0.17** 0.01 0.14* 0.31** 0.42** 0.38** -
19. Decision Unfair 0.05 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.19** -0.07 -0.20** -0.20** -0.24** -0.22** -0.23** -
20. Decision Disrespectful -.062 -0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.27** -
21. Decision Greedy -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.13* 0.38** -
22. Decision Aggressive -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.13* -0.11 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.13* -0.01 0.01 0.18** 0.14* 0.24** -0.01 0.36** 0.30** -
23. Endorsement V1 0.01 -0.01 0.12* 0.07 0.05 0.44** -0.29** -0.22** 0.46** -0.12* -0.11 0.07 0.09 0.13* 0.12* 0.11 0.16** 0.12* 0.06 0.07 0.12* 0.18** -
24. Endorsement V2 -0.08 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.30** -0.14* -0.09 0.30** -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.46** -
25. Endorsement V3 -0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.40** -0.21** -0.12* 0.42** -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.10 0.10 0.15* 0.10 0.65** 0.38** -
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Manipulation Checks: 
Aggression-for-Status Norm Manipulation: If there were an effect of this manipulation 
then it might be that the pro-aggression condition drove the rejection rate up, or that the 
anti-aggression condition drove the rejection rate down, or a combination of both. To 
unpack this, Helmert contrasts were created. These planned contrasts allowed 
investigation into whether the pro-aggression condition differed from the neutral and 
anti-aggression conditions (Helmert 1 contrast coefficients: 1, -0.5, -0.5) and whether the 
anti-aggression condition differed from the neutral condition (Helmert 2 contrast 
coefficients: 0, 1, -1). A series of ANOVAs, using the Helmert contrasts to predict 
participant ratings of perceived teammate values, revealed that the primary manipulation 
check questions significantly varied as a function of aggression endorsement condition 
(all ps < 0.001, partial η2 ranged from 0.16 to 0.76). Summary statistics for these 
Helmert contrasts are shown in Table 3. Participants in the pro-aggression condition rated 
their teammates as valuing dominance and aggression more than participants in the 
neutral and anti-aggression conditions. Further, participants in the neutral condition rated 
their teammates as valuing dominance and aggression more than participants in the anti-
aggression condition. Conversely, participants in the pro-aggression condition rated their 
teammates as valuing compassion, fairness, and compliance less than participants in the 
neutral and anti-conditions. Participants in the neutral condition rated their teammates as 
valuing these variables less than participants in the anti-aggression condition.  
Table 3. Summary statistics for Helmert contrasts comparing aggression-for-status norm 
manipulation group ratings of teammates’ values 
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Variables Mean Difference p Cohen’s d 
Pro vs. Neutral & Anti    
   Dominance 3.68 < 0.001 2.35 
   Aggression 3.64 < 0.001 2.28 
   Compassion -2.28 < 0.001 -1.40 
   Fairness -1.64 < 0.001 -0.99 
   Submissiveness -1.26 < 0.001 -0.75 
Neutral vs. Anti    
   Dominance 2.42 < 0.001 1.86 
   Aggression 2.69 < 0.001 2.16 
   Compassion -1.89 < 0.001 -.140 
   Fairness -1.53 < 0.001 -1.07 
   Submissiveness -0.93 < 0.001 -0.63 
  
Interestingly, the extent to which participants stated that they related to their 
teammates also varied according to condition, F(2, 569) = 108.06, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 
0.28. Participants in the pro-aggression condition reported that they related to their 
teammates less than those in the neutral and anti-aggression conditions (Mean difference 
= -1.40, p < 0.001, d = -0.78). Further, participants in the neutral condition reported that 
they related to their teammates less than participants in the anti-aggression condition 
(Mean difference = -1.83, p < 0.001, d = -1.23).  
After their decision in the UG, participants were asked whether they thought their 
teammates would respect them/like them/view them as a leader based on their decision to 
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accept or reject. These functioned as manipulation checks in that, presumably, if the 
aggression-for-status manipulation were successful then there would be differences in 
responses between groups. For example, those in the pro-aggression condition would 
assume their teammates would respect them more if they behaved aggressively (i.e., 
rejected the offer), whereas the reverse would be true in the anti-aggression condition. So 
in this case both responses (accept and reject) were meaningful. Significant differences 
were found for two of the three questions.  
For the question regarding gaining the respect of their teammates, a 3x2 ANOVA 
was performed using the aggression-for-status norm manipulation (with the Helmert 
contrasts described above) and UG decision (accept or reject) as independent variables. 
Differences across groups were expected—even for those who chose to accept—if the 
manipulation was salient enough. For example, those who accepted the unfair offer 
would seem more likely to assume their teammates would respect them if in the anti-
aggression condition than those who accepted in the pro-aggression condition. There was 
a main effect of response (i.e., the decision to accept or reject), F(1, 566) = 27.77, p < 
0.001, partial η2 = 0.05. There was also a significant interaction between the aggression 
condition and the response, F(2, 566) = 4.64, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.02). A simple-
effects analysis revealed that those in the pro-aggression condition who accepted felt their 
teammates would respect them less than those who rejected (p < 0.001, d = -0.70). 
Similarly, there were differences in team-respect ratings in the neutral condition between 
those who chose to accept vs. those who chose to reject (p = 0.004, d = -0.43). There 
were no significant differences in the anti-aggression condition. 
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Regarding the participants’ perspective on whether their teammates would view 
them as a leader based on their decision in the UG, a similar set of relationships were 
found. A 3x2 ANOVA again revealed a main effect of response, F(1, 566) = 33.64, p < 
0.001, partial η2 = 0.06 and a significant interaction between decision and aggression-
for-status condition, F(2, 566) = 6.91, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.02). A simple effects 
analysis showed that those participants who rejected the unfair offer in the pro-
aggression-for-status condition rated their teammates as significantly more likely to view 
them as a leader than participants in the pro-condition who accepted (p < 0.001, d = -
0.86). Similarly, there were differences in team-leader ratings in the neutral condition 
between those who chose to accept vs. those who chose to reject (p = 0.002, d = -0.46). 
There were no significant differences in the anti-aggression condition, and there were no 
significant results to report regarding the question about whether their teammates would 
like them based on their decision to accept or reject.  
Group Manipulation: There was a concerning issue with the group manipulation. After 
interacting in the UG, and after the follow-up questions, participants were asked to report 
with whom they just competed. This was a manipulation check to ensure the participants 
understood with whom they were interacting (teammate or rival). A large number of 
participants (N = 129, or 22.6%) answered this incorrectly. It also appeared that the 
majority of those who answered incorrectly were in the “rival” condition. It was 
hypothesized that the length of the UG directions, procedure, and subsequent questions 
was long enough that participants may have forgotten with whom they were interacting 
and used the offer they received (which was encountered more recently and likely more 
emotionally salient) as a heuristic. That is, if they could not remember with whom they 
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were interacting but the offer was considered particularly low or unfair, then perhaps 
participants assumed they must have been interacting with a rival since only a rival would 
provide such a low offer. If true, then presumably there would be a relationship between 
the condition to which they were assigned (teammate or rival) and the likelihood of 
incorrectly reporting the condition to which they were assigned, with those who 
incorrectly reported their interlocutor being more likely to be in the teammate condition.  
A Chi-square analysis revealed a statistically significant relationship (χ² (1, 559 = 
95.59, p < 0.001); see Figure 1) between the team condition and the likelihood of a 
correct answer on the follow up question (Who did you just interact with: Teammate or 
Rival?). Specifically, of the 129 individuals who answered incorrectly, 114 of them (or 
88%) were in the “team” condition but reported being in the “rival” condition. This is not 
conclusive evidence of the mechanism that led to the incorrect answers (i.e., the heuristic 
mentioned above), however it nonetheless revealed a notable confound in the group 
manipulation. 
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Figure 1. Chi-square results showing systematic error in teammate condition 
 
Primary analyses: By way of reminder, the primary hypothesis were as follows: 
H1: The aggression-for-status norm manipulation would predict the decision to 
accept or reject the offer in the UG (main effect), with those in the pro-aggression 
condition rejecting more than those in the anti-aggression condition. 
H2: The group manipulation would predict the decision to accept or reject the 
offer in the UG (main effect), with those in the rival condition rejecting more than 
those in the teammate condition.  
H3: The above effects would be maximal among those with low 2D:4D 
(interaction). That is, if 2D:4D is associated with status acquisition and 
maintenance rather than aggression per se, then low 2D:4D will be associated 
with the most rejection when aggression is good for status and the least rejection 
when aggression is bad for status. Further, if 2D:4D is a proxy for an 
androgenized, or “masculinized”, brain, then low 2D:4D will predict the least 
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amount of rejection when interacting with a teammate and the most amount of 
rejection when interacting with a rival. 
As mentioned, there was a notable methodological problem with the group 
manipulation. Because of this, the group manipulation condition was dropped from the 
models regarding the primary DV. Stepwise binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to predict the decision to accept or reject the offer in the UG, with the 
following predictors: the aggression-for-status norm Helmert contrasts, the continuous 
2D:4D variable, and their interaction terms (Helmert I x 2D:4D, Helmert II x 2D:4D). 
Separate analyses were performed for both the right and left digit ratios. The predictors 
did not account for a significant portion of variance in the behavior in the UG, either in 
the model with the right digit ratio (χ² (4) = 4.92, p = 0.30), or in the model with the left 
digit ratio (χ² (4) = 5.9, p = 0.21). The addition of the two-way or the three-way 
interactions did not improve model fit, all ps > 0.24. Models for both right and left hands 
were run excluding the group condition and, similarly, the predictors did not account for 
a significant portion of the variance in behavior in the UG (right hand: χ² (3) = 2.94, p = 
0.40; left hand: χ² (3) = 4.00, p = 0.26). Further, models were run for both the left and 
right hands including the group condition but excluding those participants who answered 
incorrectly regarding with whom the interacted. These models did not account for any 
significant portion of the variance in behavior in the UG, either (right hand: χ² (4) = 8.30 , 
p = 0.08; left hand χ² (4) = 8.12, p = 0.07). Inclusion of interaction variables did not 
significantly improve the models (all ps > 0.05). A summary of the results with respect to 
the primary hypotheses can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of primary hypotheses and results. 
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Hypothesis Support 
H1: Main effect of aggression-for-status 
norm manipulation—pro-aggression = 
more rejection; anti-aggression = less 
rejection. 
Did not receive support from any models 
tested.  
H2: Main effect of group manipulation—
rival condition = more rejection; teammate 
condition = less rejection. 
Did not receive support from any models 
tested. 
H3: Interaction between 2D:4D and above 
variables—low 2D:4D = most rejection in 
pro-aggression and rival conditions; low 
2D:4D = least rejection in anti-aggression 
and teammate conditions.  
Did not receive support from any models 
tested. 
 
As a note, other than left and right 2D:4D being correlated with each other, 
2D:4D showed no significant relationship with any other measure in any analysis 
performed, including zero-order correlations, as well as tests of main effects and 
interactions. However, both the group manipulation and the aggression-for-status 
manipulation were explored and found to have effects worth noting. These will be 
discussed below.  
Exploratory Analyses: 
Aggression-for-Status Norm Manipulation: As mentioned, in addition to demographic 
questions, participants filled out the Dominance-Prestige scale prior to all other 
procedures. These are important variables with regards to aggressive behavior. Although 
the aggression-for-status norm manipulation did not significantly predict the decision to 
accept or reject the UG offer, it could be that age or dominance did, or that they might 
have interacted with the norm manipulation in some meaningful way. Thus, another 
binary logistic regression was run, using age, dominance, the aggression-for-status norm 
manipulation, and all their consequent interaction terms to predict the decision to accept 
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or reject the UG offer. None of the aforementioned variables significantly predicted the 
decision to accept or reject (χ² (4) = 7.97, p = 0.09), and the addition of the interaction 
terms did not significantly improve the model (p > 0.05). 
Following each vignette participants were asked to respond to three statements 
rating whether John’s behavior was good or bad for status (i.e., If John wanted his friends 
to like him/respect him/view him as a leader then his behavior would work). Before 
responding, however, they were asked to read their teammates’ responses. Participant 
responses to these statements therefore functioned as secondary DVs in that it could be 
seen if their ratings of John’s behavior (i.e., their endorsement of aggression as a means 
to status acquisition and maintenance) would vary as a function of their group’s norms, as 
implied by their teammate’s responses. The “facets” of status (respect, like, view as a 
leader) were highly correlated within each vignette (all rs > 0.74, ps < 0.001) and they 
were therefore aggregated for each vignette. That is, “John’s friends would respect him,” 
“John’s friends would like him,” and “John’s friends would view him as a leader,” were 
all averaged for a single “endorsement of aggression for status” score for vignette 1, 
vignette 2, and vignette 3. Further, to the extent that an effect of the norm manipulation 
was found, it was necessary to better understand the effect by exploring any possible 
moderating variables. For example, the severity of conflicts appears increased when 
young males are involved (Mesquida & Wiener, 1996; Mesquida & Wiener, 1999). 
Young males also tend to engage in more violent and risky behavior (e.g., Turner & 
McClure, 2003 and Wilson & Daly, 1985). Younger people generally also seem to be 
more susceptible to peer influence (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013). To the extent that 
the norm manipulation was resulting in participants endorsing or rejecting John’s 
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aggressive behavior, these effects might have been driven entirely by younger 
participants. Therefore, age was included in the model as a predictor. It was also 
important to ask to what extent did dominance (or prestige, for that matter) drive any of 
these significant effects? Might they be interacting with the manipulation in some way? 
For example, it is possible that the pro-aggression-for-status condition might have an 
effect solely on those high in dominance.  
The two primary claims of the MWH are that males have a proclivity toward in-
group favoritism and a proclivity toward out-group aggression (McDonald, Navarrete, & 
Van Vugt, 2012). By way of reminder, vignette 1 was meant to capture aggression-for-
status within the in-group, vignette 2 was meant to capture aggression-for-status between 
two explicit rival coalitions, and vignette 3 was meant to capture a moment of “random” 
aggression toward a stranger who is not an in-group member but who is also not a 
member of an explicit rival out-group. Therefore, referring to the MWH, I hypothesized 
an interaction between the vignettes and the aggression-for-status norm manipulation. 
The pro-aggression condition would drive participant endorsement of aggression higher 
in vignette 2 (and perhaps 3) than in vignette 1, and/or the anti-aggression condition 
would attenuate participant endorsement of aggression in vignette 1 more so than in 
vignettes 2 and 3.  
 With respect to age, the MWH has made no qualifications to date. That is, 
according to the MWH, males of all ages are presumably equally likely to engage in 
parochial altruism. Therefore, the MWH might not predict an effect of age. However, as 
outlined here repeatedly, large amounts of extant data demonstrate age to be negatively 
associated with aggressive behavior (e.g., Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Mesquida & 
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Wiener, 1999; U.S. Department of Justice, 2011; Wilson & Daly, 1985). As such, one 
might expect the same relationship between age and the endorsement of aggressive 
behavior (the younger the individual male, the more they will endorse aggression for 
status). Therefore it was hypothesized that there would be a main effect of age, with 
younger males generally endorsing aggression more than older males across all vignettes 
and aggression-for-status conditions. No interactions were predicted.  
 Prestige shared no first order correlations with any variables of interest (see 
below), so it was left out of all subsequent models. Dominance, as an approach to status 
acquisition, is largely defined by acquiring status through acts of coercion, threat, 
violence, etc. It therefore might be that individuals high in dominance would display 
higher endorsement of aggression for status acquisition across the board. However, 
dominance was only positively correlated with endorsement of aggression for vignette 1. 
Individuals are known to apply dominance and prestige strategies variably depending on 
context (McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012). Therefore, it could be that 
dominance interacted with the vignettes due to contextual considerations, which is why it 
was only correlated with endorsement of aggression on a single vignette. The current 
state of the literature on the dominance-prestige scale leaves it difficult to articulate with 
any specificity what those considerations might be, so I remained agnostic about the role 
dominance might be playing.  
To investigate these hypotheses, a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed, 
using age, dominance, and the aggression-for-status norm manipulation to predict 
participants’ aggregated endorsement of aggression for status across the three different 
vignettes. The same Helmert contrasts used in the primary analyses were also used in the 
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repeated measures, comparing the pro-aggression condition to the neutral and anti-
aggression conditions (contrast coefficients: 1, -0.5, -0.5) and comparing the neutral and 
anti-aggression conditions (contrast coefficients: 0, 1, -1). Interaction terms were created 
for the Helmert contrast codes, dominance, and age (Helmert I x dominance, Helmert II x 
dominance, Helmert I x age, Helmert II x age, age x dominance).  Given dominance 
showed neither a significant main effect nor any significant interactions with any other 
variables in the model, dominance was dropped from the subsequent model for the sake 
of parsimony. The model was run again, this time using age, both Helmert contrasts, and 
their interaction terms to predict participants’ endorsement of aggression for status across 
the three different vignettes. The summary statistics for this analysis are shown in Table 
5. 
Table 5. ANOVA results for participants’ aggregated endorsement of aggression for 
status across the three different vignettes.   
 F df p partial η2 
Age  9.93 1, 565 0.002 0.02 
Vignette 4.49 2, 1130 0.01 0.01 
Pro vs. Neutral & Anti 165.26 1, 565 < 0.001 0.23 
Neutral vs. Anti 87.06 1, 565 < 0.001 0.13 
Age x Pro vs. Neutral & Anti 0.02 1, 565 0.90 0.01 
Age x Neutral vs. Anti 2.75 1, 565 0.10 0.01 
Age x Vignette 4.00 2, 1130 0.02 0.01 
Vignette x Pro vs. Neutral & Anti 8.02 2, 1130 < 0.001 0.01 
Vignette x Neutral vs. Anti 8.63 2, 1130 < 0.001 0.02 
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 There was a significant main effect of age, a significant difference in the 
endorsement of aggression for status between the pro-aggression condition and the 
neutral and anti-aggression conditions, and a significant difference between the neutral 
and anti-aggression conditions. There were also multiple significant interactions. 
Vignette interacted with age, and a simple effects analysis showed that younger people 
endorsed John’s behavior more so in vignettes 2 (p = 0.001, d = -0.29) and 3 (p = 0.001, 
d = -0.24), though there was no effect of age for vignette 1 (see Figures 2-4).  
 
Figure 2. Vignette x age interaction (no effect of age for vignette 1). 
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Figure 3. Vignette x age interaction (significant effect of age for vignette 2) 
 
 
Figure 4. Vignette x age interaction (significant effect of age for vignette 3) 
 
Vignette also interacted with the aggression conditions (i.e., both Helmert 
contrasts). A simple effects analysis revealed that participant endorsement of John’s 
aggressive behavior significantly varied by each vignette for both the pro- and neutral 
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conditions of the aggression-for-status norm manipulation. That is, in the pro-aggression 
condition there were significant differences in endorsement of John’s aggressive behavior 
between vignettes 1 and 2 (p < 0.001, d = 0.61), between vignettes 1 and 3 (p < 0.001, d 
= 0.20) and between vignettes 2 and 3 (p < 0.001, d = -0.41). In the neutral condition 
there were likewise significant differences in endorsement of John’s aggressive behavior 
between vignettes 1 and 2 (p < 0.001, d = 0.73), between vignettes 1 and 3 (p < 0.001, d 
= 0.32) and between vignettes 2 and 3 (p < 0.001, d = -0.41). For the anti-aggression 
condition, vignette 1 significantly differed from vignette 2 (p < 0.047, d = 0.19) and from 
vignette 3 (p < 0.02, d = 0.18), but the latter two did not significantly differ from each 
other (p < 0.96, d = 0.01; see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Vignette x Aggression Condition interactions. 
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As a reminder, after the UG the participants were asked a series of questions. The 
first 4 questions were about the participant’s perception of the offer (whether it was 
fair/unfair, respectful/disrespectful, generous/greedy, or friendly/aggressive). There were 
another 4 questions about the nature of their decision to accept or reject (again, whether it 
was fair/unfair, respectful/disrespectful, generous/greedy, or friendly/aggressive). A 
series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that none of these significantly varied as a function 
of aggression-for-status condition except one. The extent to which individuals rated that 
their acceptance/rejection of the offer was friendly/aggressive significantly varied 
according to aggression-for-status condition, F(1, 570) = 4.22, p = 0.02. It looked as 
though the participants in the pro-aggression condition reported their decision as 
aggressive more so than participants in the anti-aggression condition. A confounding 
issue in these results was, of course, their actual decision (accept vs. reject). There is no 
conceivable reason why someone who accepted an offer would rate it as aggressive and 
indeed there appeared to be no variability in this question among those who accepted. 
However, those who rejected an offer are likely to vary in their intent. That is, the 
decision to reject could be intended to “harm” the person who made the unfair offer (and 
is therefore more aggressive), or the decision to reject could be an impersonal rejection of 
an offer not perceived to be fair (and is therefore less aggressive). Limiting the one-way 
ANOVA to individuals who rejected the offer, there were significant differences between 
the endorsement of aggression for status conditions, F(2, 309) = 5.97, p = 0.003. A 
Bonferroni corrected post hoc analysis showed that those in the pro-aggression condition 
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and those in the neutral condition both rated their decision to reject as aggressive more so 
than those in the anti-aggression condition (p = 0.003, and p = 0.04, respectively)1.  
Using available measures, I wanted to explore possible moderators of this effect, 
looking again at age and dominance. Might those high in dominance be more likely to 
report their rejection of the offer as aggressive, irrespective of aggression condition (i.e., 
a main effect)? Or might the pro-aggression condition maximize this interpretation 
through teammate endorsement among those high in dominance, while the anti-
aggression condition attenuates this interpretation (i.e., an interaction). Again, the 
subtleties of social context that drive individuals to vacillate between approaches of 
dominance and prestige for status acquisition and maintenance have yet to be articulated 
with any specificity. This makes informed hypothesizing about possible interactions 
challenging. Therefore, I predicted a main effect of dominance, such that those high in 
dominance would rate their decision to reject as “aggressive” across all conditions of the 
norm manipulation. This was a single question (and therefore not a repeated measure), so 
a linear regression was used to explore the possible mechanisms. Only participants who 
rejected the offer were part of this analysis. Age, dominance, and the previously 
described Helmert contrasts, as well as all two-way interaction terms, were used in a 
stepwise regression to predict participant rating of their decision to reject as aggressive. 
                                                
1 To be comprehensive, a 3x2 ANOVA was performed, using “decision was 
friendly/aggressive” as a dependent variable and the aggression condition and UG 
decision as independent variables. Analysis revealed a trending main effect for the 
aggression condition, F(2, 567) = 2.87, p = 0.06, and a trending interaction, F(2, 567) = 
2.93, p = 0.05. A simple effects analysis showed that individuals who accepted did not 
vary in their aggression rating across groups, as would be expected. Of those who 
rejected, the individuals in the pro-aggression condition (M = 5.03, SD = 1.58; p = 0.001) 
and in the neutral condition (M = 4.82, SD = 1.59; p = 0.01) reported their decision to 
reject as aggressive significantly more so than individuals in the anti-aggression 
condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.82).  
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Age and dominance were added to the model first, and then the Helmert contrasts, and 
finally the interactions were added in the third step. The results of this regression analysis 
are summarized in Table 6. Neither age nor dominance explained a significant portion of 
variance in participant interpretation of their decision to reject as aggressive, R2 = 0.01, F 
(2, 307) = 0.71, p = 0.49. The addition of the aggression conditions significantly 
contributed to the model, ΔR2 = 0.04, F (2, 305) = 6.18, p = 0.002. Participants in the pro-
aggression condition rated their decision as more aggressive than participants in the 
neutral and anti-aggression conditions, and participants in the neutral condition rated their 
decision as more aggressive than those in the anti-aggression condition. The addition of 
the interaction terms did not significantly contribute to the model, ΔR2 = 0.02, F (5, 300) 
= 1.40, p = 0.27.   
Table 6. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting ratings of decision 
to reject as aggressive (n = 309). 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B  SE B β p B SE B β p 
Age -0.01   0.01 -0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.18 
Dominance 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.77 
Helmert I     0.33 0.13 0.14 0.01 
Helmert II     -0.30 0.12 -0.14 0.01 
 Model 3 
 
Age x Dominance     0.01 0.01 -0.33 0.26 
Age x Helmert I     0.01 0.01 0.12 0.35 
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Age x Helmert II     0.01 0.01 0.05 0.40 
Dominance x Helmert I     -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.71 
Dominance x Helmert II     -0.02 0.02 -0.22 0.35 
 
Group Manipulation: Despite the methodological confound of the group manipulation, 
further analyses were conducted in order to explore, understand, and improve it for future 
investigations. Because one original goal was to investigate possibly differing rates of 
rejection when interacting with a teammate vs. a rival, it was reasoned that it might be 
useful to look at the belief participants had about the person with whom they were 
interacting (did they think it was a teammate, or a rival?) instead of looking at the 
condition to which they were assigned (were they actually interacting with a teammate, 
or a rival?). A Chi-Square analysis did yield marginally significant differences, with 
those who reported they were interacting with a rival being more likely to reject an offer 
compared to those who reported they were interacting with a teammate (χ² (1, 559) = 
3.99, p = 0.046). This differed from the Chi-Square analysis using the actual condition 
(i.e., the condition to which they were assigned, rather than the condition they reported), 
which yielded no significant differences.  
Seeing the interaction (reported above) between age and vignette (older 
participants being less inclined to endorse aggression for status in conditions of conflict 
with a non-in-group member), I decided to reinvestigate the effect of the group belief on 
the primary DV (i.e., the decision to accept or reject the unfair offer in the UG). Again, 
when using what participants reported (i.e., with whom they thought they were 
interacting, instead of the condition to which they were actually assigned), a Chi-square 
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analysis showed that when participants reported to be interacting with a rival they were 
significantly more likely to reject the unfair offer. Performing the same analysis, but this 
time limiting the sample to participants below the age of 30, the results showed an 
increased effect size (Cramer’s V = 0.09 vs. Cramer’s V = 0.12). Performing this analysis 
but limiting the sample to participants 30 years of age and over, there was no significant 
effect. 
Ultimatum Game: Given the debate about what the UG is measuring—rational responses 
to unfair behavior, or aggression per se—a series of questions followed participants’ 
decision in the UG. They were asked four questions about how they perceived the offer: 
Was it fair vs. unfair, respectful vs. disrespectful, generous vs. greedy, and friendly vs. 
aggressive? They were also asked four questions about how they perceived their decision 
to accept or reject: Again, was it fair vs. unfair, respectful vs. disrespectful, generous vs. 
greedy, and friendly vs. aggressive? Finally, they were asked three questions about their 
feelings upon seeing the offer: Did you feel calm vs. bothered, upbeat vs. dejected, and 
happy vs. angry? A series of independent samples t-tests were performed to better 
understand the differences between those who chose to accept the unfair offer, vs. those 
who chose to reject the unfair offer. Regarding the perceptions of the offer, there were 
significant differences between those who chose to accept and those who chose to reject, 
for all four questions, with those who chose to reject rating their perception of the offer 
more negatively (e.g., more unfair, more disrespectful). For the questions pertaining to 
perception of their own decision to accept or reject, there were also significant 
differences but only for three of the four questions. Participants rated their decision to 
accept or reject as equally fair. There were also significant differences in the rating of 
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their emotions upon seeing the unfair offer, with those rejecting rating their emotions as 
more negative. See Table 7 for full results. 
Table 7. Independent samples t-tests for perceptions of offer, decision, and affect 
 t P 95% CI	 Cohen's d	
   Lower Upper  
Offer: Fair vs. Unfair -7.88 <0.001 -0.96 -0.58 -0.66 
Offer: Respectful vs. Disrespectful -6.17 <0.001 -0.77 -0.41 -0.52 
Offer: Generous vs. Greedy -5.98 <0.001 -0.58 -0.3 -0.51 
Offer: Friendly vs. Aggressive -4.97 <0.001 -0.63 -0.27 -0.42 
Decision: Fair vs. Unfair -0.67 0.51 -0.32 0.16 -0.06 
Decision: Respectful vs. Disrespectful -8.37 <0.001 -1.41 -0.87 -0.71 
Decision: Generous vs. Greedy -14.05 <0.001 -1.95 -1.47 -1.18 
Decision: Friendly vs. Aggressive -16.44 <0.001 -2.54 -2.01 -1.38 
Calm vs. Bothered -4.62 <0.001 -0.99 -0.41 -0.39 
Upbeat vs. Dejected -4.08 <0.001 -0.66 -0.23 -0.34 
Friendly vs. Angry -5.75 <0.001 -0.77 -0.38 -0.48 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for offer, decision, and affect 
 Accept Reject 
 M SD M SD 
Offer: Fair vs. Unfair 5.56 1.40 6.33 0.92 
Offer: Respectful vs. Disrespectful 5.53 1.25 6.11 1.01 
Offer: Generous vs. Greedy 6.09 1.00 6.52 0.74 
Offer: Friendly vs. Aggressive 5.59 1.19 6.03 0.98 
Decision: Fair vs. Unfair 2.20 1.45 2.28 1.46 
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Decision: Respectful vs. Disrespectful 2.44 1.58 3.58 1.46 
Decision: Generous vs. Greedy 2.14 1.44 3.85 1.46 
Decision: Friendly vs. Aggressive 2.45 1.61 4.72 1.68 
Calm vs. Bothered 4.19 1.79 4.88 1.81 
Upbeat vs. Dejected 4.93 1.25 5.37 1.33 
Friendly vs. Angry 4.76 1.22 5.33 1.17 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this study was to investigate potential moderating variables 
between 2D:4D and aggressive behavior, by exploring the conditional nature of 
aggressive behavior based on social norms pertaining to status. Given the inconsistent 
nature of previous results tentatively linking the 2D:4D and aggression, it was posited 
that, instead of 2D:4D predicting aggression per se, perhaps 2D:4D is associated with 
status acquisition/maintenance and would only be associated with aggression when 
aggression was perceived to be good for status (Millet, 2010). Status is primarily 
allocated by others based on their perceptions of one’s adherence to group norms and 
usefulness in accomplishing group goals (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Therefore, the 
utility of aggression as a means to acquiring status was manipulated across three groups 
by changing the group norms associated with aggression. In one group aggression was 
endorsed as a legitimate means to gaining status, in a control group aggression-for-status 
was left ambiguous, and in a third group aggression was proscribed as a means for 
gaining status. Low 2D:4D individuals (i.e., presumably status-oriented individuals) were 
hypothesized to be most sensitive to this and most likely to adjust their behavior 
accordingly. It was consequently predicted that low 2D:4D individuals would be the most 
likely to reject an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game in the pro-aggression condition and 
least likely to reject an unfair offer in the anti-aggression condition (Millet & Dewitte, 
2008; Millet & Dewitte, 2009). Further, the MWH predicts that in times of potential 
conflict males will demonstrate parochial altruism, favoring in-group members and 
expressing coalitional aggression toward out-group members (Van Vugt, 2009; 
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McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012). To the extent that 2D:4D is a proxy of 
exposure to prenatal androgens, and hence, androgenization or “masculinization” of the 
human brain in development, then lower 2D:4D should predict increased hostility toward 
out-group members and, at the very least, diminished hostility toward in-group members. 
Finally, given the above rationale, a three-way interaction was predicted such that low 
2D:4D individuals would be the most aggressive when in the pro-aggression condition 
and interacting with a rival, and the least aggressive when in the anti-aggression 
condition and interacting with a teammate.  
None of the primary hypotheses received support from the data. 2D:4D was 
unrelated to any measured variable. Further, there was a problem with the group 
manipulation that made a proper analysis, and hence, a proper test of these hypotheses, 
problematic. A notable subset of participants responded incorrectly to a question about 
whom they were interacting with during the Ultimatum Game. Specifically, a large 
proportion of individuals in the teammate condition incorrectly reported as having 
interacted with a rival. However all is not lost and, in fact, some useful information may 
still be gleaned from the data.  
GROUP MANIPULATION 
It is important to note that the errors participants made regarding the group 
manipulation were systematic. Of the 129 individuals who answered incorrectly, 114 of 
them were in the team condition but reported being in the rival condition. The source of 
this bias is unclear. It was hypothesized that perhaps individuals, after having been told 
who their interlocutor was, simply forgot when asked due to too much time having 
passed and too much information having been processed. They then may have used the 
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offer as a heuristic since it was more recent and probably more salient. If one cannot 
remember with whom they were interacting then it makes sense to use the offer, which 
was low, to assume it must have been a rival since a teammate presumably would not do 
such a thing. There is evidence that people can use heuristics in their decision to accept or 
reject an offer (Stephen & Pham, 2008). However, currently there is no research 
suggesting that the offer amount can be used as a heuristic when attempting to recall 
details about those who made the offer, so this interpretation is necessarily speculative. 
Another possibility is that this question is an unintentional suspicion check. That is, 
perhaps participants could accurately remember who they were told they were interacting 
with but, since the offer was low, they assumed they were being “tricked” by researchers. 
They may have perceived the question as implying, “You were told with whom you 
would be interacting. Now that the interaction is over, with whom do you think you were 
really interacting?” Unfortunately it is impossible to test either of these hypotheses with 
the current data since it was an unintended and unforeseen outcome. It also could be due 
to an error in the way the information was conveyed to the participants, leaving many of 
them truly unsure about with whom they were interacting. Yet such error would 
presumably be random, which was not the case.     
Despite the group manipulation being confounded, to the extent that participants 
reported they were interacting with a teammate or a rival did relate to their decision to 
accept or reject the offer in the Ultimatum Game. That is, using participant reports on 
who they were interacting with, instead of which condition they were actually assigned 
to, showed that those who reported as interacting with a rival rejected the offer 
disproportionately to those who reported as interacting with a teammate. This is a 
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methodological failure but perhaps nonetheless implies a (flawed) conceptual success, 
since the ultimate goal was to see how individuals treated others based on what they 
believed about their group membership. Still, this made the primary model problematic to 
analyze since the group manipulation was not methodologically sound, and any attempts 
to do so in spite of this failure yielded null results regarding the primary hypotheses, 
anyway.  
AGRESSION-FOR-STATUS NORM MANIPULATION  
The group manipulation confound made other analyses challenging as well. Of 
those in the pro-, neutral, and anti-aggression conditions, half of each group would have 
also been assigned to the teammate condition, which was problematic due to the large 
amount of participant error. Ignoring this source of error and keeping all participants in 
the analysis, there was no difference in rejection rates between the pro-, neutral, or anti-
aggression conditions. Excluding all participants in the teammate condition, since that is 
where the error seemed to reside, also yielded no differences in rejection rate between the 
aggression conditions. This latter analysis also severely reduced the sample size, which 
may also have obscured any possible effects. In summary, all analyses of the aggression 
condition yielded no observable effects on the primary DV, which was the decision to 
accept or reject the unfair offer in the UG. It still may be premature to discount the 
manipulation.  
There were many significant effects of the manipulation on the secondary DVs. 
For example, the extent to which participants endorsed John’s actions as likely to earn his 
friends’ respect, liking, or perceptions of being a leader all varied as a function of the 
condition to which they were assigned for every single vignette. Participants in the pro-
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aggression condition endorsed John’s aggressive behavior for the acquisition of status 
significantly more so than those in the neutral condition, who in turn endorsed John’s 
aggressive behavior more than those in the anti-aggression condition. This is despite the 
fact that all participants read identical vignettes. The only difference was their 
teammates’ reports on John’s behavior, which participants read before giving their own 
answer. The sizes of these effects were not trivial (partial η2 ranging from medium (0.13) 
to large (0.23). So why might the norm manipulation affect participant endorsement of 
aggressive behavior for status, but not affect their behavior in the UG?  
One interpretation is that participants were simply subject to social pressure. That 
is, individuals felt pressure to adjust their answers to their teammates’ answers since 
participants were outnumbered (Asch, 1951). This pressure might account for the fact 
that participant’s answers varied as a function of aggression condition, yet so did the 
extent to which participants reported that they related to their group, with people in the 
pro-aggression condition relating to their team the least and people in the anti-aggression 
condition relating their team the most. In short, perhaps they did not agree with, and thus 
did not relate to, their teammates but they nonetheless adjusted their answers to match 
their teammates because they felt outnumbered. A more distal evolutionary explanation 
of the above effect is that acquiescence to group norms is a way of signaling the potential 
of cooperative behavior. Mathematical models have shown that signaling, even if costly, 
is a way for an individual to display his or her quality as a mate, coalition partner, or 
competitor (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001), and that strong reciprocity—one side of 
which is a proclivity to cooperate with in-group members—may be an evolutionarily 
selected trait that facilitates cooperation among non-kin (Gintis, 2000; Bowles & Gintis, 
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2004). Displaying agreement with group norms, even if one does not actually agree, 
could be a quick and clear signal in otherwise ambiguous situations that an individual is a 
worthy, i.e., a cooperative, teammate.  
Further, there is evidence to suggest that distance, both psychological and 
physical, can moderate susceptibility to social influence. Ledgerwood and Callahan 
(2012) reasoned that, “The social norm today is likely to be the same as the social norm 
next year and will be relevant across a wide range of contexts. Thus, if psychological 
distance truly increases the extent to which evaluations incorporate information relevant 
for relating to an object across contexts, it should strengthen the tendency for a person’s 
opinions to align with those of his or her group,” and they found evidence supporting 
this. The psychological distance that strangers have when interacting online should result 
in increased susceptibility to social influence when it comes to evaluating normative 
information, and the results of the current study support this notion. As such, many 
possible psychological phenomena may account for the effects of normative information 
influencing participant endorsement of John’s behavior despite them concurrently 
reporting their ability to relate to their teammates least in the pro-aggression condition. 
Whether they actually endorsed John’s behavior privately cannot be ascertained by the 
current measures, however, so future research might attempt to disentangle public vs. 
private conformity. 
Yet there is more to the story here. Of those who rejected the offer, participants in 
the pro-aggression condition rated their rejection as “aggressive” significantly more so 
than those who rejected in the anti-aggression condition. Participants also rated their 
teammates as more likely to respect them and view them as a leader based on which 
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aggression condition they were in, depending on how the behaved in the UG. Those who 
rejected the offer rated their teammates as more likely to respect them and view them as a 
leader when in the pro-aggression condition than when in the anti-aggression condition. 
Those in the pro-aggression condition who rejected also felt their teammates would 
respect them and view them as a leader when they rejected more so than when they 
accepted.  
Given that most of the secondary DVs suggested the aggression-for-status norm 
manipulation affected participants in a variety of arguably intuitive ways, why then were 
there no differences in the rejection rate of the offer, which after all was the primary DV? 
There are many possibilities. The first and most obvious conclusion is that the 
manipulation affected social signaling; however, the inability to relate to such norms in 
the pro-aggression condition, as captured by participant ratings, impeded the influence on 
behavior in the UG (as outlined above). That is, there may not be a behavioral effect, 
which is why one was undetected. In seeing their teammate’s values on display, 
participants may have been willing to “play along” by giving lip service in order to 
appear as a cooperative teammate, which would account for the differing responses to the 
vignettes between the aggression groups. Yet when it was (allegedly) time to acquire 
tickets for a chance at winning a gift card they defaulted to more self-oriented behavior. 
In short, in this specific context group norms may not affect an individual’s behavior as 
soon as any kind of resource is at stake for that individual. 
Conflicts between the interests of the self and that of the group can play out in 
complex ways (Bornstein, 2003). This may be an instance of that, no doubt influenced by 
the ad hoc nature of group formation in this study. Again, there was an effect of the norm 
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manipulation on participants’ evaluation of John’s behavior, but no effect on participants’ 
decision to accept or reject an unfair offer. Given the former, the latter may be an 
informative null result. Nearly everyone wants to feel like a valued member of one’s 
group (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). Valuation by the group is often 
determined by the adherence to and the expression of group norms, and these norms are 
often derived from group goals (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, when a proximate 
group goal is “conflict with another group”, or even when an individual faces 
interpersonal conflict that will knowingly be perceived by group members and filtered 
through the lens of group norms, some individuals can feel psychologically and/or 
physically unsuited for the task. After all, be it physical or otherwise, be it personal or 
group-oriented, conflict is risk. This puts one in a quandary: “I want my group to value 
me. Members allocate my value based largely on my perceived suitability for 
accomplishing group goals and my adherence to group norms. However, the current 
situation is one in which I find myself hard pressed to adhere to group norms. What do I 
do?”  
One solution to such a dilemma, though itself not without risk, is so simple and 
common as to be trite. Aggression and conflict can indeed be costly, but talk is cheap. 
During times of threat one can signal one’s adherence to the group and its norms by 
verbally endorsing behaviors that one may have no intention to carrying out personally. 
After all, the pending conflict may never actually come to fruition. An individual’s 
bluffing or saber rattling may not be solely serving the function of (hopefully) 
intimidating the opponent(s). It may also preserve or even be an opportunity to improve 
the individual’s status within the group during this transient time of interpersonal or 
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intergroup tension—again, even if that individual has no intent to act upon their norm-
driven proclamations. There are many terms and phrases for this type of behavior: False 
bravado, bluster, “all bark and no bite”, a paper tiger, or in the case of pending violent 
military conflict, a chicken hawk.  
When asked about their decision to accept or reject the unfair offer in the UG, and 
whether their teammates would respect them or view them as a leader based on that 
decision, participants reflected and reported, with their responses breaking down based 
on the aggression condition to which they were assigned. This is informative. At the very 
least, it suggests their continued awareness of their teammates’ values (i.e., their group’s 
norms) throughout the experiment. This further suggests that, to the extent that there was 
no effect of the norm manipulation on the DV, this was not because they had forgotten 
their group’s norms (at least when asked). If this is the case then the fact that the norm 
manipulation affected participant endorsement of aggression yet did not affect their 
decision to accept or reject the unfair offer is meaningful. Again, it could be that 
individuals were signaling their adherence to group norms but nonetheless unwilling to 
let such norms dictate their behavior because of their disagreement with such norms (i.e., 
based on their reported ability to relate to their teammates). That is, this could be a “paper 
tiger” phenomenon in which individuals endorse aggression for social reasons but fail to 
act aggressively due to personal risk. This notion of a paper tiger may be best interpreted 
in light of a dual-process theoretical perspective on moral judgment (Greene et al., 2004).  
  Of those who rejected the unfair offer, participants in the pro-aggression 
condition of the norm manipulation rated their rejection as “aggressive” more than those 
in the anti-aggression condition. This is curious because these are identical responses 
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from participants (rejection of unfair offer) being interpreted differently (more or less 
aggressive) based on the aggression condition of the norm manipulation. According to 
dual-process theory, reasoning can be conceived of as being executed by two separate 
systems, with on system being automatic, associative, and often emotionally driven, 
while the second system is slower, deliberate, and potentially rule-governed (Kahneman, 
2003; Greene, et al., 2004). Given that it is the least resource intensive, the automatic 
system is what individuals generally rely on. They only transition to the second system 
when engaged in more demanding tasks. It could be that participants sensed potential loss 
or personal risk and reacted emotionally to the low offer in the UG. They therefore 
defaulted to the automatic, emotionally driven system in their decision to accept or reject. 
Presumably a reflexive response would not be influenced by the inputs of norms recently 
gathered from a newly formed group, and hence there would be no effect of the norm 
manipulation on the decision to accept or reject. However, the second, more deliberative, 
system might be required to articulate the intent behind one’s decision, in which case 
participants might then cognitively reflect on group norms and use them to justify their 
decision post hoc. In short, group norms—in this case particularly those of an impromptu, 
ad hoc group—may not influence an individual’s behavior, particularly when norm-
consistent behavior results in notable personal risk; yet, they may nonetheless influence 
an individual’s interpretation of his (or her?) behavior after the fact when doing so is 
advantageous.  
Even with a “paper tiger” interpretation in hand, it is still not the whole picture. 
Exploratory analyses showed that there was a main effect of age, with younger males 
generally endorsing aggressive behavior for status more so than older males. This general 
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tolerance of, or even support for, aggression among younger males is not entirely 
surprising, however, given that young males are primary drivers of violent crime, for 
example (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). There was also an interaction between age 
and vignette regarding the endorsement of John’s aggressive behavior. Specifically, there 
was no effect of age in the rating of John’s behavior in vignette 1, but there was an effect 
of age in the rating of John’s behavior in vignettes 2 and 3. In vignettes 2 and 3 
exclusively, older participants endorsed John’s aggressive behavior significantly less than 
younger participants. Again, vignette 1 was meant to capture aggression-for-status within 
the in-group, vignette 2 was meant to capture aggression-for-status between two explicit 
rival groups, and vignette 3 was meant to capture a moment of “random” aggression 
toward a stranger who is not an in-group member but who is also not a member of an 
explicit rival out-group. It would seem that older males are less inclined to endorse 
aggression as a means to status acquisition and maintenance in contexts of out-group 
conflict (or conflict with an non-in-group member).  
To bolster this notion further, when looking at with whom participants reported 
they were interacting during the UG, a teammate or a rival, participants did reject an 
unfair offer more when they reported as having interacted with a rival; however, the 
effect size of this phenomenon was larger when looking at only those individuals under 
30 and vanished when looking at individuals 30 and over. Should results like these be 
replicated consistently, perhaps the Male Warrior Hypothesis should be renamed the 
Young Male Warrior Hypothesis. Conceptually, this observation is not unique (see 
Mesquida & Wiener, 1996 and Mesquida & Wiener, 1999). It also suggests that while the 
proclivity to endorse coalitional aggression as a means to gaining/maintaining status may 
 70 
attenuate with age, the endorsement of aggression for gaining/maintaining status within 
one’s in-group does not necessarily. Again, this may not be terribly surprising given the 
intrinsic and far-reaching human concern with status within one’s group (Anderson, 
Ames, & Gosling, 2008; Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Magee & Galinsky, 
2008; Pettit, Yong, & Spataro, 2010; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012).  
Another important consideration gleaned from the current study is the importance 
of context outside of group norms. That is, the aggression-for-status norm manipulation 
affected participant endorsement of John’s aggressive behavior across all vignettes, but 
not equally so. Only in the anti-aggression condition did each vignette not significantly 
differ in participant endorsement of aggressive behavior, and that lack of difference 
might be due to a “floor effect”, in that participant endorsement of aggression in that 
condition was so low that it may not have generated enough variability for differences 
between all vignettes to be detected. Even so, in the anti-aggression condition vignette 1 
received more endorsement of aggression that both vignettes 2 and 3. In fact, vignette 1 
received the strongest endorsement of John’s aggressive behavior across the board. This 
is interesting because it is also the only condition in which there is in-group aggression 
taking place and the MWH hypothesis would seem to suggest that males should engage 
in more favoritism (i.e., less aggression) toward in-group members (McDonald, 
Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012). In this vignette John was shoved first, so it may be that 
participants perceived him as being provoked. However provocation took place in all 
vignettes. In vignette 2 John was provoked verbally, but he escalated the situation to one 
of potential physical violence. Perhaps that is why vignette 2 received the least amount of 
endorsement across all conditions. In vignette 3 John was the “victim” in that a careless 
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driver cut him off, yet he also may have been perceived as escalating the situation by 
rolling down the window and retaliating verbally, but not physically, which may be why 
endorsement of vignette 3 fell in between 1 and 2. In short, in vignettes 2 and 3 John may 
be perceived as escalating a confrontation to varying degrees, but vignette 1 may be 
perceived as a more justified “tit-for-tat” response, and this perception of escalation 
might have attenuated participant endorsement of his behavior despite the “teammate 
endorsement” not wavering.  
2D:4D 
The measurement of 2D:4D appeared sound, with the left and right hands being 
correlated well and the distributions of both hands appearing normal. This is despite it 
being an online measurement of pictures uploaded by participants, as opposed to the 
more traditional in-person measurements taken in a laboratory environment. However, 
2D:4D showed no significant effects with any measured variable; again, the only 
exception being the correlation between the right and left hands of participants, 
suggesting it was measured adequately. This may not be entirely surprising given the 
inconsistency with which 2D:4D yields significant relationships in general (e.g., Putz et 
al., 2004), however one of the primary goals of this study was to address that very 
inconsistency theoretically (Millet, 2010). Despite the lack of evidence, concrete success 
or failure in this regard cannot be determined with any confidence due to previously 
discussed methodological issues with the group manipulation and the inability to detect 
behavioral differences on the dependent variable in the aggression manipulation.  
It may be telling, however, that even when significant relationships were found 
with other variables, 2D:4D still played no role. For example, if 2D:4D is associated with 
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status acquisition and maintenance, then presumably it should be associated with 
increased ability to detect a group’s status-relevant norms. After completing the vignette 
questions and seeing what their team values were with regards to aggression and status 
acquisition, when participants were asked what their group valued (aggression, 
compassion, fairness, etc.), there were no significant differences in ratings between high 
and low 2D:4D participants based on the aggression condition to which they were 
assigned. Nor were there any interactions between aggression conditions and 2D:4D 
regarding whether one’s teammates would respect them or view them as a leader based 
on their decision to accept or reject. It could be that the aggression manipulation was 
strong enough to provide a ceiling effect (or floor effect, depending on the condition) that 
would obscure differences between high and low 2D:4D. That is, the team’s values were 
so explicit that anyone could perceive them equally well, irrespective of status 
orientation. Of course, if the aggression manipulation was this strong, then this begs the 
question of why did it not interact with 2D:4D to affect behavior in the UG?  
Again, effects of 2D:4D are notoriously inconsistent and generally small when 
present (e.g., Putz et al., 2004; Vorcek & Loibl, 2009; Hönekopp & Watson, 2010). 
Further, many studies include measurements of both the left and right hand, the mean of 
the two, and the difference between the two, in addition to including a variety of other 
trait and behavioral variables of interest (Putz et al., 2004). As mentioned above, as of 
2009 there were over 300 papers documenting relationships between 2D:4D and various 
traits and behaviors, and there are certainly more now, many with results hinting at a 
narrative. Yet although it was stated at the outset that it seems unlikely the entirety of the 
literature on 2D:4D is an aggregate of Type I errors, given its context
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effect, and recent concerns with replication in social psychology (Ioannidis, 2005; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015), this may not be outside the realm of possibility. In fact, it 
is a legitimate concern in this case particularly since small effect sizes are even more 
demanding of large sample sizes for dependable results, requiring many hundreds of 
participants (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). To put it clearly, with a history of 
inconsistent and small effect sizes, questionable statistical power, and a large set of 
variables from which to cherry pick a statistically significant relationship, the importance 
of 2D:4D as a viable biological variable within psychology requires some serious and 
honest scrutiny2. 
For 2D:4D to stand uncontested as a variable associated with multiple human 
traits and behaviors, more research needs to be performed using larger sample sizes and 
consistent measures. To the extent that any remotely consistent results already exist, they 
seem to point at the right hand as being the most common suspect and, combined with 
animal studies suggesting the same (Manning, 2011; Zheng & Cohn, 2011), future 
studies would do well to limit their primary analyses to the right hand only. More 
importantly, this should be combined with having theoretically driven a priori hypotheses 
with an upward limit on variables included in the analyses so as to attenuate the 
likelihood of Type I error.  
ULTIMATUM GAME 
 The UG did not reveal consistent differences in behavior based on the primary 
manipulations in the current study. However, questions posed to participants following 
                                                
2 Indeed, after the current study was completed but before it was written, Turanovic, 
Pratt, and Piquero (2017) provided meta-analytic evidence that places the alleged 
relationship between 2D:4D and aggressive behavior in serious doubt. 
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their decision in the UG revealed potentially interesting insights. That there were 
differences between those who accepted and those who rejected regarding their 
perceptions of their decision to accept or reject is not entirely surprising. People who 
accept are not likely to rate their acceptance as “aggressive”. People who reject are not 
likely to rate their rejection as “generous”. Interestingly though, whether participants 
accepted or rejected, they rated their decision as “fair” roughly equally. This may not be 
surprising when interpreted through the lens of how they perceived the offer.  
 Those who rejected the offer rated their perception of it as more unfair, greedier, 
more disrespectful, and more aggressive than those who accepted. They also rated 
themselves as having more negative affect upon seeing the offer (i.e., more bothered, 
more dejected, and angrier), relative to those participants who accepted. If one perceives 
an offer as particularly unfair, aggressive, disrespectful, etc., then they are likely to view 
their rejection as “fair”, in a tit-for-tat sense; however, if one is less negatively affected 
by their perceptions of the offer then they may perceive their acceptance of the offer as 
“fair” in spite of, or perhaps even because of, it being a low offer. If we consider the 
largest effect sizes of the mean differences among these various ratings, then the picture 
we are left with is that participants who rejected the offer perceived it as particularly 
unfair, were particularly angered by this, and therefore rejected the offer with the intent to 
harm (i.e., aggressive intent). Do these data then suggest that the UG is a legitimate 
measure of aggression and not simply a measure of broader socioeconomic behavior? 
This is a false dichotomy, of course, because aggression can be part of socioeconomic 
behavior. Given that participants in the pro-aggression condition rated their rejection as 
more aggressive than those in the anti-aggression condition, it would seem that rejection 
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in the UG can be an act of aggression, but only for some people and only some of the 
time.  
At worst this suggests that the UG is not a particularly clean measure of 
aggressive behavior. At best, however, to the extent that the UG does capture a modicum 
of aggression, it may be a particular kind of aggression. Altruistic punishment is when 
individual punish despite the fact that the punishment is costly to them and yields no gain 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Again, looking at the effect sizes of the follow up questions, 
participants who rejected were the most angered, and with regards to the perceived 
unfairness of the offer. This is in line with aggressive behavior. Yet keeping in mind that 
rejection of the offer guarantees that no one gets anything, rejection in the UG may be a 
specific manifestation of altruistic punishment. There is intent to punish (or harm, i.e., 
aggression) but at the cost of one’s forsaken gains. This is a subtle but important detail 
for those contemplating use of the UG in the context of broader aggressive behavior. 
Another subtlety not addressed in the current study is that of implicit motives. The self-
report measures in the current study addressed only explicit motives, yet it is known that 
implicit motives are associated with dominance and other status relevant variables, such 
as testosterone, gaze aversion, and even implicit learning in contest situations 
(Schultheiss, Campbell, & McClelland, 1999; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2001; Terburg, 
Hooiveld, Aarts, Kenemans, & van Honk, 2011). Future studies exploring the UG may 
consider investigating the role such implicit motives may play in the decision to accept or 
reject an unfair offer.  
Nonetheless, in hindsight it would seem that other measures of aggression might 
yield greater insight than the UG for the purposes of this study. For example, the 
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aggression manipulation consisted of vignettes that primarily focused on reactive, 
physical aggression. This was to ensure the aggression manipulation was salient, but such 
direct aggression may not translate behaviorally to the less explicit aggression inherent in 
rejecting an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game. Using a measure such as the Taylor 
Aggression Paradigm (TAP), which is more associated with physical aggression 
(Giancola & Parrott, 2007), might provide more insight about the aggression-for-status 
manipulation. That is, a better match between the type of aggression in the manipulation 
and the type of aggression in the dependent variable may work to maximize differences 
in behavior between the groups. The TAP has the added benefit of measuring three 
different types of aggressive responses: Unprovoked, retaliatory, and extreme (Giancola 
& Parrott, 2008). In the first round of the reaction time competition within the TAP, the 
participant is often predetermined to “win”, thus allowing them to determine the 
magnitude and length of the “punishment” without having received it themselves. As 
such, this is a measure of their tendency to aggress without having been provoked. After 
the trials continue and the participant loses a round and are “punished”, researchers can 
see how the participant’s future punishments change. That is, how the participant 
aggresses in retaliation to the punishment they received. Finally, researchers can look at 
the overall magnitude and length of punishment each participant engaged in, giving a 
measure of “extreme” aggression for those who selected higher magnitudes and greater 
durations of punishment on average over the course of the procedure. To the extent that 
status-relevant normative information might affect these different factors at all, it may do 
so differentially. Due to various logistic considerations, such as sample size, the length of 
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the study, attrition, and the rate of data acquisition, utilizing the TAP was not possible in 
this study but future investigations using similar manipulations may benefit from its use.  
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 The current study encountered a methodological obstacle, but it nonetheless 
revealed some useful information. Group norms pertaining to status did affect the extent 
to which individuals publicly endorsed aggressive behavior. Group norms affected 
participants’ metacognition about how their group members would allocate them status 
based on their behavior. Group norms affected the extent to which individuals interpreted 
their behavior as an act of aggression after the fact, and despite these norms not affecting 
their actual behavior. Questions about participants’ perceptions of the UG offer and of 
their subsequent decisions highlighted the applications and limitations of the UG as a 
measure of aggression. Responses to these questions also provided a more detailed and 
empirical insight into the nature of the decision to accept or reject. The “paper tiger” 
phenomenon highlighted the collision of personal interests vs. group interests—the Me 
vs. Us dilemma of social animals—and showed that although individuals may default to 
more self-interested behavior when at personal risk, they may interpret that self-interested 
behavior through the lens of group norms or demands, post hoc. Further, the endorsement 
of aggression varying by vignette highlighted that there is important context beyond 
group norms that goes into evaluating the “appropriateness” of aggressive behavior.   
The immediate goal of this study was to investigate specific hypotheses 
surrounding 2D:4D, status, and aggressive behavior. However, the meta-goal was to 
construct a more complicated model needed to outline contextually dependent human 
social behavior more effectively. This meta-goal may be the study’s undoing. With so 
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many variables being measured and manipulated, issues ranging from curious to 
confounding compromised testing the overall model. Conceptually this is a model worth 
testing, however. Understanding the mechanisms of aggressive behavior alone is worth 
pursuing. Status is a highly pursued resource and dominance (of which aggression is a 
tool) is one pathway to its successful acquisition, but there are more peaceful ways to 
acquire status as well, such as prestige, and people vary between these approaches readily 
(Cheng et al., 2013). This is useful knowledge, yet it is but the broadest outline. When 
and why to people change strategy? Successful behavioral strategies for acquiring status 
are largely constrained by group norms and norms can vary wildly between human 
groups, ranging from hyper-cooperative to internecine (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 
2015). Are there individual differences in the ability to detect normative cues? If so, are 
these differences rooted in a biological proclivity or are they simply a matter of better or 
worse social cognition? 
Results in this study suggested that people are at least willing to signal their 
endorsement of status-relevant norms. After all, talk is cheap. The potency of norms to 
affect behavior in this study is nonetheless ambiguous. Failure to generate behavioral 
changes might be a methodological issue; however, it may be something else. People 
presumably choose their groups based on personal interests and values, so it may be 
naïve to think they would alter their behavior based on the values of a temporary ad hoc 
group they were thrust into, as was the case in this study. Yet that does not mean that 
group norms about aggression as a means to status acquisition are irrelevant. It simply 
means that such norms may be second to individual beliefs, and these beliefs may be less 
pliable. Beliefs are levers to action, so aggressive behavior as a means to status 
 79 
acquisition may be less variable within an individual across contexts. Another way of 
thinking about this is to conceive of everyone’s “baseline” proclivity toward aggressive 
behavior as a means to status acquisition as being different, and there may be a certain 
amount of variance around that baseline depending on the context. If this is the case then 
a measure of the beliefs one has about the efficacy of aggression specifically as a means 
to gaining and maintaining status would prove useful. 
One obstacle to such a measure is the confounding factor of social desirability. 
Individuals may be hesitant to convey their honest beliefs about aggression for acquiring 
and maintaining status because they fear such a confession could undermine their status. 
This might be addressed with an indirect approach, by asking participants to rate other 
individuals’ behaviors in specific social contexts (e.g., via vignettes, similar to the 
aggression manipulation in this study) instead of being asked to disclose their personal 
beliefs explicitly. However we saw in this study that responses in such an approach can 
be “pushed around” by group member responses. Another option could be modifying the 
implicit association test to measure implied beliefs about aggression and status 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In addition, creating factors within the 
measure that capture direct and indirect aggression distinctly would be necessary given 
their different applications across contexts (and between sexes, e.g., see MacAndrew, 
2014).  
Social psychology is the study of minds colliding with the environment. For 
example, the current study showed not only differences in the endorsement of aggression 
based on the normative condition to which participants were assigned, but also 
differences in endorsement of aggression based on the vignette. It is speculated above 
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that the differences in rating between the vignettes may be due to participant perceptions 
of provocation, or a lack thereof, with respect to John. However, this is necessarily 
speculative. What precisely are the conditions that led to these differences in ratings? 
What situational cues were most salient and useful for participants when making their 
decisions? This is important in understanding aggressive behavior, given that its efficacy 
for status acquisition and maintenance is situationally contingent. But it also important 
because it is a testable idea, assuming a measure exists to quantify such contextual 
details. Speculation need not persist where science can be done. Therefore, in addition to 
a measure of individuals’ subjective psychological mechanisms associated with 
aggression and status jostling—the “psychology” part of social psychology—it would 
also be useful to have a reliable and objective measure of situational cues—the “social” 
part of social psychology. Rauthmann and colleagues (2014) have developed a candidate 
measure that, though still nascent, has shown promise in both reliability and predictive 
power. Described as a taxonomy of “major dimensions of situation characteristics”, the 
measure purports to function similarly to personality measures (e.g., Big Five) but for 
psychologically salient features of a given situation (Rauthmann et al., 2014). The 
measure is an abbreviated version of the Riverside Situational Q-Sort (RSQ; Sherman, 
Nave, & Funder, 2010, 2012, 2014; Wagerman & Funder, 2009) and is said to capture 
eight dimensions of situational characteristics: Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, 
pOsitivity, Negativity, Deception, and Sociality (DIAMONDS).  
Using this measure, one might investigate whether challenges to status are 
comprised of a relatively specific and consistent constellation of these dimensions, or 
whether various dimensions are particularly salient to status-motivated individuals. 
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Further, the extent to which an individual believes aggression is endorsed for gaining 
status among their cohorts is presumably driven by the social feedback the individual 
receives and interprets. That is, beliefs about norms must be largely derived from the 
group’s expression of those norms—but norms are not always expressed explicitly. 
Having an objective taxonomy of psychologically salient situational features might help 
elucidate which of those features an individual uses to infer ambiguous normative 
information. Such situational information could be applied not just to an understanding of 
aggression and status specifically, but to human social behavior more generally. It could 
also be used to increase efficacy when manipulating social variables in the laboratory, 
improving the “signal” in the signal-to-noise ratio of often-ambiguous social interactions. 
Given the complexity of this study and the challenges encountered, future 
endeavors may yield greater success by first breaking the investigation into pieces, 
establishing whether there are consistent effects and what the mechanisms might be, and 
then putting it back together (with some necessary methodological modifications to 
increase clarity and preserve results). For example, a study (or many studies) 
investigating the aggression manipulation alone (perhaps using the TAP instead) might 
provide greater insight as to whether there is a behavioral effect without the confounding 
issues that came with the team manipulation. Using subtler aggression cues in the 
vignettes might increase the chances of finding differences in sensitivity to status-
relevant cues, with regards to 2D:4D for example. The in-group/out-group contingency is 
no doubt important to understanding aggressive behavior as well. Do individuals interpret 
in-group norms about aggression as applying only to interactions with out-group 
members? Or do such norms also apply to interactions with in-group members? It is also 
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important to note that the role group norms play in social aggression as a means to 
gaining status, in the end, may not be linked to 2D:4D, or any biological variable. 
Perhaps the 2D:4D variable should be jettisoned altogether. Reactivity to norms may be 
purely a function of social learning. Yet norms about aggression and personal beliefs 
pertaining to them almost assuredly play some important role in social interactions. 
Investigating this notion further would surely yield insight into the highly complicated 
ways in which individuals navigate the social labyrinth of status acquisition, irrespective 
of biological correlates.  
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APPENDIX 
VIGNETTES 
Vignette 1:  
John is out with a new group of friends. John gets along with almost everyone, except for 
one guy, Brian, who occasionally makes rude comments to John. Later in the evening 
while John is waiting for a drink at the bar, Brian walks past and rudely shoves John 
while giving him a dirty look. John notices that the rest of his new friends are watching, 
so he decides to shove Brian back. 
Vignette 2:  
John is with his friends at his university’s football game and is seated close to the 
opposing team’s cheering section. When the opposing team scores a touchdown, one of 
their fans who is seated close to John makes a rude gesture towards him and then verbally 
taunts him and his friends. John then tosses his drink in the fan’s face and challenges him 
to a fight, which the fan declines. 
Vignette 3:  
John is driving in his car with a few of his friends. Another car swerves in front of him 
and cuts him off almost resulting in a car accident. John pulls up alongside the car at a 
stoplight, rolls down his window, and yells, "Learn how to drive, asshole!" 
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